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Real Copyright Reform
Jessica Litman*
ABSTRACT: A copyright system is designed to produce an ecology that
nurtures the creation, dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship.
When it works well, it encourages creators to generate new works, assists
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers,
listeners, and viewers in enjoying them. If the system poses difficult entry
barriers to creators, imposes demanding impediments on intermediaries, or
inflicts burdensome conditions and hurdles on readers, then the system fails
to achieve at least some of its purposes. The current U.S. copyright statute is
flawed in all three respects. In this Article, I explore how the current
copyright system is failing its intended beneficiaries. The foundation of
copyright law's legitimacy, I argue, is built on its evident benefits for creators
and for readers. That foundation is badly cracked, in large part because of
the perception that modern copyright law is not especially kind to either
creators or to readers; instead, it concentrates power in the hands of the
intermediarieswho control the conduits between creators and their audience.
Those intermediarieshave recently used their influence and their copyright
rights to obstruct one another's exploitation of copyrighted works. I argue
that the concentration of copyright rights in the hands of intermediaries
made more economic sense in earliereras than it does today. The key to real
copyright reform, I suggest, is to reallocate copyright's benefits to give more
rghts to creators, greater liberty to readers, and less control to copyright
intermediaries.
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The copyright statute is old, outmoded, inflexible, and beginning to
display the symptoms of multiple systems failure. Congress enacted the
current law more than thirty years ago. Most of its essential provisions had
been drafted years earlier. Copyright lobbyists wrote the 1976 Copyright
Act' in the course of protracted multilateral negotiations. The statute
includes a host of provisions that resolve difficult disputes by adopting
detailed specifications. It replaced its predecessor statute's statements of
general principle with particular language rooted in the technology and
markets of the ig6os and early 197os.2 The statute was not well-designed to
withstand change, and has aged badly. The details of specific solutions have
become irrelevant or obsolete in the face of social, cultural, and
technological change.3 Copyright-intensive businesses have come to
Congress insisting on new specifications to solve new problems.4 In the
ensuing process of inter-industry negotiations to tailor statutory proposals to
the quirks and caprice of affected interests, the specifications have attracted
a swarm of limitations, qualifications, restrictions, and conditions as a
compliant Congress inserted them into the law.5 Today, title 17 of the United
States Code is a swollen, barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible
prose.6
Historians and copyright lawyers with long memories know that we've
faced this problem before.7 Copyright law's confrontation with evolving
technology has been a near-constant theme since Congress enacted its first
copyright law in 1790.8 More than once in the past, copyright laws have

I.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, go Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1205 (2oo6)).
2.
SeeJESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-34, 54-63, 122-45 (2d ed. 2006). Compare,
e.g., Copyright Act of 190g, ch. 320, § 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1075 (defining scope of and exceptions to

exclusive right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit), with Copyright Act of 1976
§ I1o (listing exemptions from public performance right).
LITMAN, supra note 2, at 57-63, 197-202.
See, e.g., Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, 11 1th Cong. (2009); Fair
Copyright in Research Works Act of 2oog, H.R. 8o1, 11 1th Cong. (2009); Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2oo8, S. 2913, 1 ioth Cong. (2008); Intellectual Property Enforcement
Act of 2007, S. 2317, 1ioth Cong. (2007); Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S.
2560, io8th Cong. (2004).
3.

4.

5. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1o9-9,
i19 Stat. 218 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); Satellite
Home Viewing Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 1 i8 Stat.
3393 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
6.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. H 110(2), 114.
See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDINGJUNE 30, 1902, S. Doc. No. 57-6, at 64 (2d Sess. 1902), available at http://www.

7.

copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1902.pdf; Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 515-16 (1945).
8.

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15,

1 Stat.

124.
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grown badly outdated before copyright-affected industries could muster the
political influence to persuade Congress to enact new ones. The current law
may break down in more extreme ways than in the past, and the law's
language may be many times longer, more detailed, and less
comprehensible than in earlier episodes, but this sort of difficulty has
plagued copyright history repeatedly. 9 When faced with this problem in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, lawyers for copyright-intensive interests
pursued several strategies to enable them to make do. First, copyright
lawyers avoided inconvenient statutory language by persuading courts to
interpret the words of the statute to mean one thing in one context, and a
very different thing in another.' 0 Second, they negotiated a series of bandaid solutions with other copyright interests in which they agreed to behave
as if the statute on the books said what they wished it did." Third, they sat
down with one another and tried to come up with a revision of the copyright
statute that would scratch their respective itches. That process always took
much longer than they expected, but, eventually, copyright lobbyists
generated the language of a statute that Congress obligingly enacted into

9. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275
(1989).
io. Perhaps the best-known example is the meaning of the word "publication" under
sections io and ig of the igog Copyright Act. See Am. Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740,
744 (2d Cir. 1956) ("[T]he courts apply different tests of publication depending on whether
plaintiff is claiming protection because he did not publish and hence has a common law claim
of infringement-in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute
'publication'-or whether he is claiming under the copyright statute-in which case the
requirements for publication are quite narrow."). Compare Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d
702 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that distribution of one hundred copies without notice to small
group constituted general publication and divested copyright), and White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d
744 (9 th Cir. 1952) (holding distribution of twenty copies with a cover letter .uggesting
recipients pass the copies on constituted divestive general publication), with King v. Mister
Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that distribution of many copies to
the press from the press tent was only a limited publication, which did not forfeit copyright).
Today we see something similar with computer-mediated uses: Copyright owners have
persuaded courts that a work is fixed for the purpose of the creation of an infringing copy as
soon as it appears in the random access memory ("RAM") of a computer, but do not argue that
appearance in RAM is sufficient fixation for the purpose of copyright's vesting. Aaron
Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 201o). Similarly, copyright
owners have argued that the transmission of a single copy over a network should count as
publication for the purposes of infringement, but have denied that transmitting a single copy
triggers the library of Congress deposit obligations that attach to a work upon initial
publication. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 407.
11. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 47-50. For a current analogue, see, for example, Principles
for User Generated Content Services, UGCPRINCIPLES, http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2010).
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law. The resulting statute was, of course, longer, less flexible, and more
vulnerable to obsolescence than the one it replaced.' 2
Copyright insiders, having watched (or participated in) some of the
early ameliorative moves this time around, are beginning to make noises
suggestive of a new round of statutory overhaul. Groups are meeting
privately to generate preferred solutions to copyright law problems.13
Businesses are asking their pet members of Congress to float statutory
balloons.14 Various trade associations are trying to position themselves to
claim that the items at the top of their wish lists are already well-established
under current law.'5
There's some queasiness attached to launching a new copyright
overhaul. Copyright revision is lengthy and expensive, even in the best of
circumstances. The number of interests affected by copyright is huge, and
the complaints those interests have with the current regime are diverse.
Overhauling the copyright statute took more than twenty years the last time
Congress tried it, and there's no reason to think it could happen more
quickly today. These are not, moreover, the best of circumstances. The

See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 48-63, 122-45. It's commonplace that copyright rights
12.
keep expanding. U.S. copyright statutes are worse, doubling in size faster than healthcare or
tuition costs.
13. See, e.g., Pam Samuelson et al., The Copyright PrinciplesProject: Directionsfor Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://btlj.org/data/articles/25-3/cpp.
pdf (reporting conclusions of three-year project that invited a group of twenty copyright experts
"to explore whether it was possible to reach some consensus about how current copyright law
could be improved and how the law's current problems could be mitigated"); A Special
Conversation with Marybeth Peters, AUDIO ARCHIVE (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.archive.org/

details/FMCsummito7.petersconversation (describing unsuccessful negotiations among music
and recording industry interests to reform 17 U.S.C. § 1' 5).
See, e.g., Ted Johnson, Pots OK Bill on Royalties, VARIETY, May 14, 2009, 2oog WLNR
14.
9209693 (describing lobbying over bill to require radio broadcasters to pay performance
royalties to the owners of sound recording copyrights); Wendy Davis, Entertainment Industry
Pushes for Law Requiring Colleges To Filter Networks, MEDIAPOST (March 24, 2008), http://
publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.san&s=7 9 058&Nid=40725&P=9187
39 (describing lobbying over bill to require colleges to block students' peer-to-peer file
sharing).
See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Bertelsmann, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
15.
(seeking to expand the scope of secondary liability for copyright infringement); Brief for
Americans for Tax Reform as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 15-17, Cartoon Network
LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F-3 d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv (L), 07-151 1-cv
(CON)) (arguing that momentary transient reproduction in computer's RAM violates
§ 1o6(i)); Brief for ASCAP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 17-19, Viacom Int'l v.
YouTube, Inc., Nos. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 07 Civ. 3582 (LLS), 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y.June
23, 2010) (seeking a narrow construction of the scope of the Internet service provider safe
harbors in 17 U.S.C. § 512); Brief for Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. as Amici Curiae at 14-20,

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2oo8) (No. 06-1497)
(claiming that making a file available for distribution violates 106(3)). See generally LITMAN,
supranote 2, at 24.

HeinOnline -- 96 Iowa L. Rev. 5 2010-2011

IOWA LAW REVIEW

6

[Vol. g6: 1

copyright bar, once a cozy sewing circle of plaintiffs' lawyers,' 6 has grown
intensely polarized over the past twenty years, and copyright discourse has
become increasingly strident.'7 That has nourished an atmosphere of
profound distrust, which makes it harder to agree on terms.
Interested parties have reason to be nervous about what might go
wrong. Because major copyright legislation typically takes many iterations
and many years between introduction and enactment, most copyright
lawyers are, at least to some degree, experts in copyright legislative history.
Students of past legislation know that in the course of any major copyright
revision, new copyright-affected players have popped up and demanded that
the law be reshaped to accommodate their needs. In the revision process
that culminated in the enactment of the igog Copyright Act, for example,
the manufacturers of phonographs and phonograph records nearly derailed
the entire effort until they were satisfied with their treatment under the
statute.' 8 Multiple attempts to modernize the copyright law during the
192os

and

1930s foundered because new players ASCAP

and radio

19

broadcasters could not agree on anything. In the revision process that led
to the 1976 Act, broadcast television, and then cable television, showed up
and demanded special treatment; copyright revision ground to a halt until
they got it.2o In the five-year effort that resulted in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,2 ' telephone companies and Internet service providers were
able to block the enactment of provisions sought by the entertainment and
software industries until liability safe-harbor provisions for ISPs were added
to the bill. 2 2
The prospect of upstart new copyright interests may be especially scary
today because there are millions of ordinary people whose use of YouTube
and peer-to-peer file-sharing networks gives them a direct, personal stake in
the copyright law.23 Nobody has yet succeeded in mobilizing them into a
16. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright Unbound, in AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT,
REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS), at WEIN-1, WEIN-1 (Iris C. Geik et al.
eds., 2005).
17.
See Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 3 4 th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. i (2006).

J.

at 39-40 and sources there cited.

18.

See LITMAN, supra note

ig.

See id. at 42-45.

20.

See Litman, supra note 9, at 326-32 and sources there cited.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998)

21.

2,

§§ 101, 108, og, 112, 114, 512, 1301).
See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 127-45 and sources there cited. During the same five-year

(codified at 17 U.S.C.
22.

period, composers, music publishers, and motion picture studios pursued an extension of
copyright's term from seventy-five (or life plus fifty) years to ninety-five (or life plus seventy)
years. Bar and restaurant owners, angry at the cost of performing rights licenses, blocked term
extension until proponents agreed to insert a bar and restaurant exemption into the termextension bill.
23. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 845-46 (2009) ("Hundreds of millions of Internet
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significant political force, but the majority of them are over eighteen, and
many of them vote. It's entirely possible that over the course of a multiyear,
highly publicized copyright reform effort, the interests of ordinary voters
could end up playing more than a nominal role. 24 One can imagine
circumstances in which a new awareness on the part of Congress that voters
care about copyright could move the law pretty far from where current
players would like to see it go.
If I am right that a new cycle of copyright revision is beginning, though,
it is only barely beginning. We are currently in the very early, pre-history
stages of a revision effort. We are not yet locked in. We can still make
choices about the premises and underlying assumptions that will form the
basis of the next revision. 2 5
Much of my prior work has chronicled a depressing history of copyright
legislation, in which copyright lobbyists engaged in protracted negotiations
with one another to arrive at copyright laws that enriched established
copyright industries at the expense of both creators and the general
public.26 There's ample reason to anticipate that the next copyright revision
will proceed in similar fashion to similar ends. But what if it didn't? What if
we were able to take the opportunity to rethink our copyright system? What
sort of copyright law might we craft instead?
In Part I of this Article, I describe some of the problems the current
copyright system poses for creators, for intermediaries, and for readers,
listeners, and viewers. In Part II, I look at the copyright reform proposals
drawing serious attention, and I argue that they fail to address the problems
I described in Part I. I then, in Part III, suggest alternative goals for
copyright reform, designed to enhance the copyright system's effectiveness
users are downloading, altering, mixing, uploading, and/or making available audio, video, and
text content on personal web pages, social sites, or using peer-to-peer technology to allow
others to access content on their computer."). According to YouTube, "People are watching 2
billion videos a day on YouTube and uploading hundreds of thousands of videos daily. In fact,
every minute, 24 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube." YouTubeFact Sheet, YOUTUBE, http://
www.youtube.com/t/fact-sheet (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). The Wall StreetJournalreported in
August 2009 that "YouTube has grown into a massive destination, with 428 million unique
monthly visitors in June."Jessica E. Vascellaro, YouTube Pumps More Ads into Lineup, WALL ST.J.,
Aug. 20, 2009, at i.
24.
In June of 2009, Sweden's Pirate Party, founded in 2006 with a platform of IP reform,
captured enough votes to win a seat on the European Parliament. See Mats Lewan, Ahoy! Pirate
Party Gets Berth in European Parliament,CNET (June 8, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/83o1-1357
8_3 -102 5 9 04 8- 3 8.html. In Canada, University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist had
notable success using Facebook and his personal blog to organize opposition to Canadian
copyright reform proposals. See MICHAEL GEIsT BLOG, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/; Government
Retreats on Copyright Reform, CBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/
2007/12/s3/tech-copyright-delay.html.

See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
25.
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on
CopyrightReforn, 3 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007).
26.
See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 2.
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and its legitimacy. I argue that wise copyright reform should simplify the law;
should make the copyright system more useful for creators and for readers,
listeners, and viewers; and should divest intermediaries of excess power and
control. Those changes, I suggest, are necessary to enhance the law's
legitimacy. By that rubric, none of the current copyright reform proposals
seem like a wise revision. In Part IV, I outline a few specific suggestions for
changes that I believe would improve the copyright system's value for both
creators and their audiences. Finally, in Part V, I discuss whether there is a
realistic possibility for copyright reform of the sort I described. I cannot
currently envision a way to transform the premises of the copyright debate
enough to make it likely that such changes would be enacted anytime soon.
If we can manage, however, to encourage a broad conversation about
copyright in which we're willing to imagine unconventional solutions to
copyright's problems, we may discover that some changes are less impossible
than we expect.
I.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

A copyright system is designed to produce an ecology that nurtures the
27
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship. When it
works well, it encourages creators to generate new works, assists
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers, listeners,
and viewers in enjoying them.28 If the system poses difficult entry barriers to
creators, imposes difficult impediments on intermediaries, or inflicts
burdensome conditions and hurdles on readers, viewers, and listeners, then
the system fails to achieve at least some of its purposes. The current U.S.
copyright statute is flawed in all three respects.
A.

CREATORS' COPYRIGHT

Copyright laws, at least in theory, are designed to encourage the
creation of new works of authorship by offering creators incentives in the
27. A note on terminology: In this article, unless I am referring to specific statutory
categories, I use the word "creator"rather than "author," "disseminate" rather than "distribute,"
and "enjoy" rather than "use." I do that primarily to avoid the baggage that "author,"
"distribute," and "use" have accumulated over the past few decades. By "creator," I intend to
name the individuals who make works of authorship, to the exclusion of the entities and
employers who finance their work, whether or not those individuals are deemed "authors" in
current or past copyright laws. By "disseminate," I intend to encompass any means of making a
work available to members of the public, whether or not that behavior is within the exclusive
rights granted by copyright law. By "enjoy," I mean reading, listening, viewing, playing, learning
from, and any other use short of commercial exploitation, whether or not current law holds
that such use requires a license. See also infra note 54.
28. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 215, 383 (2009) (copyright should serve "the public interest in the creation, transmission,
and use of knowledge"). Patterson and Birch argue that while conventional copyright theory
envisioned a bilateral relationship between author and user, it should instead be based on a
tripartite relationship among author, publisher, and user. Id.
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form of control. Those incentives are said to spur creators to author new
works and make them available to the public, and to enable creators to earn
income from the dissemination of their creations.29 The law's congruence
with the theory, at least in many fields of authorship, is more aspirational
than real.30
Creators face demoralizing obstacles in searching for opportunities to
write, paint, play, or film anything the public will see or hear.31 The chance
to reach an audience has been turned into a tantalizing grand prize for
aspiring musicians,32 filmmakers,33 actors, 34 painters, 35 sculptors,36 and
photographers, 37 who are willing to endure the indignities of reality
television in the hope of scoring an apprenticeship, patron, or entry-level
job creating works of authorship. Even when creators succeed in publishing
a book, cutting an album, placing an article, or selling a screenplay,
moreover, they typically earn only a small share of the proceeds of the
copyrights in their works. In most creative spheres, authors' control over
their works is short-lived, and the earnings they collect from them are

29.

See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHwAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL

JUKEBOX 7 (1994); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2001). As Diane Zimmerman has recently reminded us, the

soundness of the basic copyright incentive theory is, so far, merely theoretical. See Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 201 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1515964.
See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 117-19 (2009).
30.
See, e.g., TODD LONDON ET AL., OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE
31.
NEW AMERICAN PLAY 2 (2009) (Theatre Development Fund study finding a "system of theatrical
production that has become increasingly alienating to individual artists and inhospitable to the
cultivation of new work for the stage"); Michael Cieply, Films Findinga Tougher Market in Toronto,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at Cl (reporting that the vast majority of independent films shown
at the 2oog Toronto film festival failed to find an American distributor); Jon Pareles, 1,700
Bands, Rocking as the CD Industry Reels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2oo8, at Al ("There's never a
shortage of eager musicians. Many bands drive cross-country by van or cross an ocean to
perform an unpaid showcase at South By Southwest, and the most determined ones play not
only their one festival slot but also half a dozen peripheral parties as well, hoping to be
noticed."); BEFORE THE MUSIC DIES (B-Side Entertainment 2006) (documentary film about the
music and recording industries).
32. See, e.g., American Idol (FOX television series 2002-2010); see also Pareles, supra note
31.

33. See, e.g., On the Lot (FOX television series 2007); Project Greenlight(HBO 2001-2005).
34. See, e.g., Grease: You're the One that I Want (NBC television series 2007); High School
Musical: Get in the Picture (ABC 2oo8); Legally Blond the Musical: The Search for Elle Woods (MTV
television series 2008).
35. See Randy Kennedy, When Art Meets TV, Realism Might Not Make It to Reality, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2009, at Ci (hundreds of painters audition for new reality show to discover unknown
visual artists).
36. See Work ofArt: The Next Great Artist (BRAVO television series 2010).
37. See The Shot (VHI television series 2007) (reality show competition among still
photographers for "$soo,ooo, the chance to shoot a fashion spread for Marie Claire magazine,
and have their shot on the cover of a Victoria Secret catalog").
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modest.38 The control of their works and the bulk of the proceeds they earn
are held instead by copyright owners who serve as intermediaries between
the authors and their audiences. 39
Only a few creators get rich from copyright royalties. A somewhat larger
number are able to make a living from creating works of authorship, but the
majority of creators need day jobs to supplement their income.40 The
academy is full of poets, novelists, painters, composers, and performers who
teach; the waiter who brought your meal the last time you dined in New
York or Los Angeles is most likely there awaiting his or her next audition.
Why is authorship so unremunerative? It isn't that people don't value
works of authorship enough to spend money for them. Studies of the
economic contribution made by copyright industries to the U.S. economy
report that they generate more than a trillion dollars annually.4' Very few of
those dollars, however, end up in creators' pockets. The copyright statute
incorporates a decided bias in favor of distributors. That bias comes
primarily at creators' expense. Although U.S. copyright law vests copyright as
an initial matter in authors' hands, the creator is not necessarily the author
as a legal matter. All works created by employees within the scope of their
employment and many works created by independent contractors are
deemed to have been authored by the employer or commissioner as a
matter of law.42 For other works, the creator is the author and owns the
See,e.g., DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALLYOU NEED To KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 6838.
g8, 386-91, 398-404 ( 5 th ed. 2003); Herman Finkelstein, The Copyight Law-A Reappraisal,

1o4

U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1051 (1956); BEFORE THE Music DIES, supra note 31.
See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967); PATRY, supra
39.
note 3o, at 117; Graeme W. Austin, Keynote Address, 28 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 397 (2004).
40. See LONDON ET AL., supra note 31, at 5o-8o (reporting that even successful playwrights
cannot make a living from their plays); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Musicians, Singers and
Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-1 1 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/
oco/pdf/ocoso95.pdf ("Part-time schedules-typically at night and on weekends-intermittent
unemployment, and rejection when auditioning for work are common; many musicians and
singers supplement their income with earnings from other sources."); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, Artists and Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-11 EDITION,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosog2.htm ("Actors endure long periods of unemployment, intense
competition for roles, and frequent rejections in auditions. ... Because earnings may be erratic,
many actors, producers, and directors supplement their incomes by holding jobs in other
fields."). For other examples, see Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 9-10.
See, e.g., THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:
41.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 8 (2010), http://www.ccianet.
org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/ooooooooo354/fair-use-study-final.pdf
("In 2007,
fair use industries generated revenue of $4.7 trillion, a 36 percent increase over 2002 revenue
of $3.4 trillion."); STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES INTHE U.S. ECONOMY THE 20032007 REPORT 3 (June 2009), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2oo3-07.pdf ("By
2007 ... the value added to the U.S. GDP by the 'total' copyright industries rose to $1.52
trillion ... or 11 .05% of U.S. GDP.").

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2oo6). The United States is one of a small number of
42.
countries to have a work made for hire doctrine, and even among countries that deem
employers to be authors of some works, the scope of the U.S. doctrine is unusually broad.
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copyright as an initial matter, but the copyright system encourages the
author to assign her copyright to a distributor in exchange for
exploitation.43 Once the author transfers her copyright, the law does not
make it easy for her to retrieve it. Although the statute contains a
mechanism intended to allow authors to reclaim copyrights after 35, 40, 56,
or 75 years, 44 the mechanism was designed to make it extremely difficult to
do so.4 5 Meanwhile, creators of some works cannot as a practical matter
navigate the system as individuals. The statutory compulsory licenses, for
example, contemplate that claimants to a share of statutory license fees will
be represented by corporate or collective entities; those entities operate on
the assumption that copyrights have been assigned to distributor
intermediaries.46
Some people point out that authors have very little bargaining power as
compared with publishers,4 7 but that isn't inherent in the natural order.
Rather, it reflects the fact that the American copyright law tilts, and has
always tilted, the playing field in distributors' favor. The disparity of
bargaining power is at least partly an artifact of the way the copyright law
works.48 The copyright statute has favored publishers, record labels, motion
picture studios, and other distributors because Congress has, for the past
century, encouraged lawyers for publishers, record labels, motion picture
43. The law makes copyright assignment easy. See id. § 204. Once the copyright is assigned,
the new copyright owner stands in the shoes of the original author, and will be entitled to
exercise almost all copyright rights, including the right to sue the original creator for copyright
infringement. See, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (thirty-five or forty years after grant); id. § 304(c)(3) (fiftysix years after copyright first secured); id. § 3 04 (d) (2) (seventy-five years after copyright first
secured only if the § 304(c) termination opportunity was foregone).
45. See generally Howard Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Work
Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985); Allison M. Scott, Note, Oh Bother: Milne, Steinbeck,
and an Emerging CircuitSplit over the Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 357 (2007). See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
46. See COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/crb/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2010); SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Sept. 17,
2010).

47.

See, e.g., Gabe Bloch, Note, Transformation in Publishing: Modeling the Effect of New Media,

20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647 (2005). Creators in some industries have additional clout as a

consequence of unionization and collective bargaining, but must usually give up their
copyrights as a condition of employment.
48. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27
CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 573 (20lo). Recent court rulings reading the copyright statute to
require copyright owner permission for even tiny uses of expression from copyrighted works,
see, for example, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F. 3 d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), have
exacerbated the problem. If creators must seek myriad licenses from multiple sources before
releasing their works to the public, they will need to rely on the licensing resources of a major
distributor. See Copyright Criminals: This Is a Sampling Sport (PBS television broadcast Jan. ig,
2010), available at http://www.copyrightcriminals.com/. An additional factor in the disparity is
the large capital investment once required to engage in mass distribution of an author's works.
See infra text accompanying note 49.
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studios, and other distributors to write themselves a law that worked for
them.49 What worked for them was a system that reposed power in copyright
owners and made it easiest for distributors to end up owning the copyrights.
A law favoring distributors at creators' expense made more practical
sense in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than it does in the twentyfirst. Until recently, mass distribution of copies of works of authorship
required large capital investment. Paper, printing presses, broadcast towers,
motion picture and video cameras, stores, trucks, and the other incidents of
mass distribution networks are very expensive. Before digital networks, it was
entirely reasonable to assume that only if distributors could rely on
collecting the largest share of proceeds from copyrighted works would the
business of mass distribution seem likely to reward their investment.50
Today, of course, there are many ways of disseminating works to everyone in
the world without having to spend much money. One implication is that
individuals can transmit copies of works to one another at insignificant
expense. That is the one that's received all the attention, as copyright
owners indulge in panic over unlicensed dissemination.5' A second
implication strikes me as more interesting: the new economics of digital
distribution mean that we no longer need to shape our copyright law in ways
that disadvantage creators vis-a-vis distributors unless we want to.

49. See generally LITMAN, supra note 2. This isn't a recent phenomenon. Anglo-American
copyright law originated as a law by and for printers and publishers and has always been
distributor-centric. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 1-37; LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 42-178 (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION
OF COPYRIGHT io-66 (1993).
50. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 5-9, 75-78.
See, e.g., An Update: Piracy on University Networks: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the
51.
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, i soth Cong. 6-8 (2007)
[hereinafter An Update: Piracy on University Networks], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/printers/1loth/ 3 3 812.PDF (testimony of Cary Sherman, President, Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA")) (complaining that universities have failed to stop
"piracy where it is most rampant"); id at 75-77 (letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA")) (attributing fortyfour percent of the film industry's domestic losses to college students); ProtectingCopyright and
Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, j o9th Cong. 1617

(2005),

available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=og

senate.hearings&docid=f:34113.pdf (testimony of Marty Roe, Recording Artist, Arista Records)
(stating that peer-to-peer businesses have forced musicians and songwriters to abandon their
music careers); id. at 18 (testimony of Cary Sherman) (stating that peer-to-peer is the reason
that "[t]housands of individuals engaged in the music, film and other entertainment industries
have seen their jobs disappear"); INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES'
GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR 2oo9, http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA2oogGlobalChallenges.pdf
("Internet piracy, from infringing websites, top site pre-release groups, to unauthorized [peerto-peer] file sharing, has undergone explosive growth, hindering legitimate electronic
commerce opportunities and causing mounting losses to the music, movie, videogame, business
software and publishing industries.").
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READERS' COPYRIGHT

If creators are the natural subject of copyright, readers, listeners, and
viewers are its purpose. The most important reason we encourage creators to
make, and distributors to disseminate, works of authorship is so that people
will read the books, listen to the music, look at the art, and watch the
movies.52 We want readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy the works, learn
from them, interact with them, and communicate with one another about
them. That is the way that copyright law promotes the Progress of Science. 53
In practical terms, that means we need to make sure there's enough
freedom built into the law to ensure that copyright doesn't get in the way of
reading, viewing, and listening.
Readers, listeners, and viewers54 have, until recently, been the
beneficiaries of a law designed to allow most people to enjoy copyrighted
works without worrying about the copyright law. For most of copyright law's
history, it has applied narrowly, directly affecting only individuals and
businesses for whom copyright was a central concern. By granting copyright
owners control over specified, defined uses and leaving other uses
unconstrained, copyright law gave readers, listeners, and viewers
considerable freedom to enjoy copyrighted works.55 Copyright law protected
only a small number of works, conferring narrow rights for relatively short
periods of time. The limited scope of copyright left large free spaces that
permitted readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy copyrighted works as they
wanted to without attention to what the copyright law said. There weren't
many express user rights in the statute; there didn't need to be. Congress or
the courts stepped in to add express user rights only in instances in which
copyright owners overreached the boundaries of their rights by filing suit

52.

See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 75-76; L. Ray Patterson, Fair Usefor Teaching and Research:

The Folly of Kinko's and Texaco, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES,
EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY 351, 356-63 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997).
E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). See generally
53.
Lloyd L. Weinreb, CopyrightforFunctionalExpression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149 (1998).

54. The literature discussing the public's interest in copyright is struggling with the issue
of just what should we call the folks who read, listen to, look at, watch, play, run, and build
works of authorship. Popular choices include "users," see Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in
CopyrightLaw, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, "consumers,"
see Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 11 ig
(2007); Joseph Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003), and
"fans," see Fred Von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea, LAw.CoM (Sept. 29, 2004),
http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1095434496352. See also Justin Hughes, "Recoding"
IntellectualProperty and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) ("non-owners").
In this Article, I call individuals enjoying copyrighted works "readers" or "readers, listeners, and
viewers."
55. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 25-36; Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 1871 (2007).
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over reasonable-seeming practices.56 The basic architecture of the system
respected the rights of readers, listeners, and viewers by limiting the reach of
copyright rights, rather than by setting out the scope of individual audience
interests in explicit terms.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea that
copyright law constrained how readers may read books, how listeners may
listen to music, or how viewers could watch television programming would
have been seen as a radical expansion.57 As technology has enabled
individuals to enjoy works in new ways, however, copyright owners have
asked for greatly enhanced control over their works. Copyright owners have
insisted to Congress and the courts that, because copyrights are their
property, nobody should be allowed to make a valuable use of a copyrighted
work without paying the copyright owner.58 Those arguments have fueled
both statutory and non-statutory expansions in the scope of copyright
rights.59 After persuading Congress to enact a statute prohibiting anyone
from circumventing technological protections that prevent unauthorized
access or use,6 o copyright owners have distributed copies of works in
incompatible formats, and insisted that purchasers of those copies have and

56. The statute's express user exemptions provisions are idiosyncratic, and most of them
trace their origin from ill-considered lawsuits. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1o9(a) (2oo6) (allowing
resale of lawfully made copies), id. § iog(c) (permitting people to play videogames in public
places), id. § 1 10(5) (A) (permitting people to play radio and television broadcasts in public
places), and id. § 1 10(11) (permitting in-home use of censorware to block the sexual or violent
scenes in movies released on DVDs), with Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975) (rejecting infringement claim for playing radio in small restaurant), Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (19o8) (rejecting infringement claim for discount book resale), Red
Baron-Franklin Park Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F. 2d 275 ( 4 th Cir. 1989) (holding arcade liable
for public performance of videogames), and Cleanflicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F.
Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (enjoining commercial entities from editing commercially
released DVDs to remove sexual or violent content).
57.

SeeJessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 917, 932-42 (2005); L.

Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A PreliminaryInquiry into a Need for a FederalStatute of Unfair
Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385 (1992).
58. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act and Parity Among Music Delivery Platforms: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, i ith Cong. 9--1 1 (2009) [hereinafter The Performance Rights
Act], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=i ii _senate_
hearings&docid=f: 5 4 5 5 7.pdf (testimony of Marian Leighton-Levy, Founder and Owner,
Rounder Records); see also id. at 14 (testimony of Ralph Oman, Lecturer, George Washington
University, and former Register of Copyrights) ("It comes down to this, . . . [a]s a matter of
property rights, men and women who create and own a copyrighted work should have the right
to get paid for it by the people who use their works. That is the basic premise of copyright
protection.").
59. Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 587, 593-96 (2oo8).
6o. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204); RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control
Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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should have no legitimate claim to be able to bypass technological locks. 6 '
Readers, listeners, and viewers today face inconvenience and inflated prices,
and a future in which businesses roll out more maddeningly incompatible
formats.6 2 Meanwhile, enhanced copyright-owner control has squeezed
reader, listener, and viewer freedom to enjoy works in ways that depart from
the copyright owners' menu. If an important purpose of copyright law is to
encourage reading, listening, and viewing, a law that makes those acts less
likely is counterproductive.6 3 If the copyright system is designed in a way
that significantly impairs the reading, listening, and viewing of copyrighted
works, then it will fail to accomplish one of its core goals.
Copyright laws that make reading, listening, and viewing more difficult
are problematic for a second reason: the sheer pointlessness of some of
these restraints has undermined the perceived legitimacy of the U.S.
copyright system. 64 Copyright law's legitimacy has suffered marked erosion

61.
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, RM 2oo8-8, Reply Comments (Feb. 2, 2009),
Motion
available at http://www.copyright.gov/12o/2oo8/responses/dvd-cca-inc-38.pdf;
Picture Ass'n of Am., RM 2oo8-8, Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/1201/2008/responses/mpaa-46.pdf; Software & Info. Indus. Ass'n, RM 2oo8-8, Reply
Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/ 12Or/ 2008/responses/
software-information-industry-assoc-17.pdf.
62. See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL
CULTURE 267-81 (2007); Nate Anderson, DRM Still Sucks: Yahoo Music Going Dark, Taking Keys
with It, ARS TECHNICA (July 24, 2oo8, 3:00 PM) http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/2008
072 4 -drm-still-sucks-yahoo-music-going-dark-taking-keys-with-it.html; Cory Doctorow, How To
Destroy the Book, Speech Before the National Reading Summit (Nov. 13, 2009), in THE
VARSITY, Dec. 14, 2oog, available at http://thevarsity.ca/articles/23855. There are other
problems with current DRM regimes: some of them give publishers more control over
purchased content than consumers have any reason to expect. In July of 2009, for example,
Amazon.com resolved a copyright dispute with the publisher of George Orwell's Animal Farm
and 1984, by automatically deleting purchased copies of both e-books from purchaser's Kindle
e-book readers, and crediting their accounts for a "return." See David Pogue, Pogue'sPosts: Some
E-Books Are More Equal than Others, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://pogue.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/07/17/some-e-books-are-more-equal-than-others/. See generally Updated and
Corrected:E-Books Buyer's Guide to Privacy,ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.eff.
(summarizing
org/deeplinks/201o/o1/updated-and-corrected-e-book-buyers-guide-privacy
privacy-related policies of popular e-book readers).
63. See GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 273-79; John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of
Technological ProtectionMeasures, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1181, 1 198-1205 (2007).
64. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 30, at 161-70 (criticizing copyright industries' misuse of

anticircumvention provisions of DMCA);Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right To ClaimAuthorship in U.S.
Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 263, 264 (2004) ("If you inquired among the
general public, 'What does U.S. copyright law protect?' many people might start by grumbling
that it overprotects piggish record companies."); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548-49 (arguing that more sophisticated
copyright enforcement has forced us to confront the "vast disparity between what activities the
Copyright Act proscribes and what the average American might consider fair or just").
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in the public's view. 65 That damage is an independent threat to the health of
the copyright system.
The current copyright system's disservice to readers, listeners, and
viewers, however, goes beyond simply impeding their enjoyment of works by
encouraging copyright owners to deploy annoying mechanisms to track,
trace, meter, monetize, and restrict it. More fundamentally, it ignores or
devalues the creativity that readers bring to the works they enjoy. Reading,
listening, and viewing have never been acts of purely passive absorption; they
have always entailed meaningful creativity and imagination. 66 The
widespread deployment of digital technology now allows readers, listeners,
and viewers to express their creative readings in fixed form and share them
with the world. They have flooded the Internet with the digital, online
instantiation of the same creative impulses that readers, listeners, and
viewers have expressed since before the invention of copyright.6 7 Most of
this creative activity has been neither exploitative nor commercial. 6 8 It has
seemed to enhance rather than detract from copyrighted works' success.
Indeed, by serving as a focus for communities of fans, it has tended to stoke
demand. 69 Most copyright owners have therefore been loath to condemn it.
The copyright system views this activity as presumptively illegal, if commonly
"tolerated."70 Rather than sheltering it under a privilege or exemption, or
drawing careful lines to divide the legal from the illegal, the law simply
pretends that it isn't there. (Unless of course, the copyright owner deigns to
object to it, at which point it needs to disappear for real.) 7 ' A system that
treats creative activity in which readers, listeners, and viewers engage every
day as a "tolerated use," ignored rather than promoted or permitted, is not a
system designed to encourage the creative enjoyment of copyrighted works.
If readers, listeners, and viewers see this law as neither sensible nor
reasonable, who could blame them?
65. Accord PATRY, supra note 3o, at xx-xxiv; Paul Edward Gellar, Beyond the Copyright Crisis:
Principlesfor Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 165, 175 (2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, How
Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 63-67 (2002); see also MARK
HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM, at xiii (2009) ("[I]ntellectual property rights do not anymore
enjoy the presumption either that they are justified or that they will endure.").
66. See Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175,
175-80.

67. See Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 697, 727-28 (2008).
68. See generally, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural
Creativity, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135.
69. See Litman, supranote 66, at 175-80.
70.

See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008) (defining "tolerated

use" as "infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may be aware, yet
does nothing about").
71. See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(enjoining publication of Harry Potter Lexicon); Cease and Desist Notices: Fan Fiction, CHILLING
EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi (last visited Sept. 17,
201o) (archive of cease and desist letters objecting to fan sites).

HeinOnline -- 96 Iowa L. Rev. 16 2010-2011

REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM

2o01o]

17

The widespread perception of the current copyright system as
illegitimate should be unsurprising. In significant part, it flows from
copyright owners' assertions that, as established copyright players, they
should be entitled to prescribe the rules for new entrants. Throughout
copyright history, entrenched players have sought to hold new players to
copyright rules written by and for established groups; the new players have
challenged the legitimacy of that move, and by and large have succeeded in
persuading Congress to enact new rules crafted to meet their needs.72 In the
early twentieth century, music publishers tried to bind piano roll makers to
the rules they had set up with music printers; dramatists and novelists tried
to force motion picture producers to follow the rules they had worked out
with theatrical producers. In the 1920s, composers sought to require
business establishments with radios to license music as if they were mounting
live performances; in the 1930s, composers and music publishers made the
same demands on motion picture theaters showing talkies. In the i970s,
copyright owners and broadcast television stations insisted that cable
television operators should need to license every signal they transmitted on
the same terms as broadcast television; in the ig80s, they made comparable
demands of satellite-TV companies. In the 19gos, copyright owners insisted
that Internet service providers should seek permission for every computer
copy of any work on the same basis that publishers and record labels were
required to license printed books and records. In every case, the businesses
exploiting the new medium successfully insisted that the new technology
required new, medium-specific rules.73 Today, book publishers, record
labels, and motion picture studios maintain that the laws they agreed on
among themselves to govern their interactions with one another are the
rules that should apply to all the ordinary readers, listeners, and viewers in
their audiences. 74 Why should the public agree that these rules are either
fair or wise?
Indeed, the dangers of this particular legitimacy crisis may be more
significant than attacks by earlier outsider groups, because a public citizenry
that believes its copyright law is illegitimate may respond by withdrawing its
support from the system. The public, after all, invests in the copyright system
both by granting rights to copyright owners through the enactment of
copyright laws, and by complying with the laws its Congress enacts. 75 If the
public perceives copyright law to give it a poor return on its investment, it
may well respond by divesting-either pressing its elected representatives to
enact additional limitations and privileges, or simply failing to comply with
72.

See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 39-41, 47-48, 58-62, 122-45.

73.

See id. at 39-47, 58-60, 127-36.

74.

See id. at 114-17.

75. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in the Internet Economy, 44
Hous. L. REV. 1073, 1076-79 (2008). Reidenberg deploys this insight to argue that copyright
disobedience is a frontal challenge to the rule of law. Id.
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rules it no longer perceives as legitimate. Millions of citizens have used
unlicensed peer-to-peer file-sharing applications to share music with each
other, even though they faced a highly publicized risk of being sued for
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Many, perhaps most, of them don't
believe they're doing anything wrong. Enforcing copyright law in an
atmosphere of public cynicism about the legitimacy of the law is a difficult
task. A public that complies with copyright only because it's afraid of the
copyright police will soon find ways to evade or restrain the copyright police.
The long-term health of the copyright system, thus, requires that members
of the public believe that their investment in copyright is well spent.
C.

INTERMEDIARIES' COPYRIGHT

The copyright system has traditionally relied on two different sorts of
intermediaries whose motivation to further the goals of copyright is
primarily economic. Distributors commonly make and distribute copies of
works of authorship and authorize other uses. Under the legacy system we
have inherited, distributors own the copyrights; they license reproduction,
adaptation, and public distribution, performance, and display. Other
intermediaries, whom I term "makers," invent and market devices and
services for enjoying works of authorship, without themselves engaging in
licensed uses. The relationship between distributors and makers has been
contested for much of copyright's history.
1.

Distributors

Under the conventional law-and-economics view of copyright,
distributors are essential.7 6 By creating a market for copyrighted works, they
both provide the money that acts as an incentive for creators to make new
works, and move copies or performances of those works to where readers,
listeners, and viewers can enjoy them. 77 As the entities who buy copyrights
from creators, these intermediaries claim to stand in the shoes of the
audience for the works;78 as the interests who sell copies and performances

76. See,e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTCE 4-20 (1989);
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, go
COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1907-16 (iggo); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that "copyright protection is essential to finance the
publications that distribute" scientific articles, even though authors are not paid for them),
affd, 6o F. 3 d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
77. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209 (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 16oo, 1602
(1982).

See, e.g., Music Licensing Reform: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S.
78.
Comm. on the Judiciary, iogth Cong. 75-88 (2005) [hereinafter Music Licensing Reform], available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1o 9 .senate-hearings&docid=f:
22919.pdf (testimony of Rob Glaser, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, RealNetworks,
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to individual readers, viewers, and listeners, they claim to stand in the shoes
of creators and collect rents on their behalf.79 Of course, distributors don't
enter into the copyright marketplace solely to promote the "Progress of
Science;"so their participation in the copyright system is fueled primarily by
self-interest.
Distributors find a lot to complain about in their current position in the
copyright system. Although distributors were primarily responsible for the
design of the current statute, they are discovering that they failed to
anticipate and solve many of the problems that its architecture poses in the
networked digital environment. Part of distributors' difficulty-the part that
has garnered the most attention-stems from the challenges posed by digital
distribution. The ease of unlicensed digital dissemination threatens the
model underlying most distributors' businesses.81
A different but equally pressing set of problems derives from the
tangled snarls attending licensing of copyrighted works.82 The law is
hospitable for large and well-established players pursuing traditional
business models.8 3 So long as a distributor is an established large copyright
player determined to continue to do whatever brought it success in the past,
the current U.S. copyright law is its friend. Control of a large repertoire of

Inc., for Digital Media Association); id. at 63-74 (testimony of Ismael Cuebas, Director of
Merchandising Operations, TransWorld Entertainment Corp., for National Association of
Recording Merchandisers).
79. See, e.g., id. at 145-48 (testimony of Irwin Z. Robinson, Chairman and Chief
Exececutive Officer, Famous Music Publishing, for National Music Publishers Association).
8o. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power . .. To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts . . . .").
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
81.
of an Access Right in US. Copyright Law, 50J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 113 (2003).
82. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 41-48 (testimony of Glen Barros, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Concord Music Group); id. at 75-78 (testimony of Rob Glaser).
83. Lobbyists for copyright-owning businesses have succeeded in persuading Congress to
enact copyright laws that allocate much of the benefit of copyright to intermediaries, and that
incorporate powerful benefits for incumbents. This advantage comes in two basic flavors. First,
when Congress enacts the rules surrounding a new right, license, or exception, it defines it in
narrow terms that fit the current practice of the incumbents who negotiated the statutory
provision but are not useful for outsiders. The exception in § 117(c) allowing computer
maintenance and repair services to turn on computers for the sole purpose of maintaining or
repairing them was drafted with sufficient narrowness to make it unavailable to people who wish
to turn on their computers for other purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006). Second,
Congress commonly gives copyright goodies to the incumbents who request them. Thus, when
Congress in 1998 extended copyright terms by twenty years, it vested the extended term in
current copyright proprietors rather than authors, subject to a narrow and difficult to exercise
termination right for a limited class of authors who had not previously sought to recapture their
copyrights. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The termination
provisions, like those for the 1976 extension of the copyright term, make it more difficult to
reassign rights under a terminated copyright grant to anyone other than the original grantee.
See 17 U.S.C. § 3o4(c) (6) (C)-(D).
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copyrighted works or of large media outlets combined with economies of
scale in licensing transactions enable established players to license
conventional uses with only modest difficulty. A creator or distributor
seeking to exploit works in new media, though, faces daunting problems in
identifying the rightsholders entitled to license its uses and negotiating the
terms of the licenses.8 4 Even established industry groups have complained
that the licensing provisions of the current law are simply unworkable for
newer uses.8 5 Innovations like copyright divisibility,86 which seemed like a
good idea at the time, 87 have vastly complicated the licensing of copyrighted
works by subjecting would-be licensees to multiple and sometimes
inconsistent demands.8 8 Small businesses that want to pay reasonable
royalties for the opportunity to exploit works in new markets can face
insuperable difficulties in arranging to do so. 89 Failing to cross all the t's and
dot the right i's, even with the assistance of counsel, is a good way to find
your business sued into bankruptcy.90
Some erosion in the position of distributors under copyright is probably
both natural and desirable. As expensive methods of distribution yield to
84. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78; Editorial, Orphan Works, D-LIB MAGAZINE,
June 2oo6, available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/juneo6/o6editorial.html; Anonymous,
Showstopper, QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG (Jan. 5, 2010, 23:49), http://questioncopyright.org/
showstopper.
85. See, e.g., Section 115 of the CopyrightAct: In Need of an Update?:HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet and IntellectualProp. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter Section 1z5 of the Copyright Act]; Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts: Balancing the
Interests of Sound Recording Copyright Owners with Those of Broadcasters:HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo8th Cong. 22-37
(2004) (testimony of Dan Halyburton, Senior Vice President/General Manager of Group
Operations, Susquehanna Radio Corp., on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters)
[hereinafter Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts].
86. Under 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(2), any subset of copyright rights may be transferred and
owned separately. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d) (2). The law does not require the owner of a copyright or
any portion of a copyright to register her claim, and registration of transfers of parts of a
copyright are rare. That makes it difficult for entities seeking to negotiate a license to
determine the identity of the appropriate licensor.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) ("[Divisibility] has long been sought by
authors and their representatives, and .. . has attracted wide support from other groups . . . .").
88. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp.
2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with OverlappingCopyrights on the Internet, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 547, 565-74 (1 9 9 7); Jessica Litman, Sharing & Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 1, 18-23 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untanglingthe Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 673, 689-702 (2003); Stadler, supra note, 67, at 732.
89. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831 (W.D. Pa.
2000); Non-waiver of Rights, SOUNDEXCHANGE (Nov. 5, 2009), http://soundexchange.com/?s=
non+waiver+of+rights.
go. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2004);
Copyright.net Music Publ'g LLC v. MP 3 .com, 256 F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); John
Borland, iCraveTV.com's Exec Discusses His Start-up's Short Life, CNET (Feb. 29, 2000), http://
news.cnet.com/2100-10

3 3 -2 3 7 4 5 0.html.
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inexpensive alternatives, the justification for giving distributors the lion's
share of the copyright fades.9' Where the design of the statute introduces
unnecessary uncertainty, expense, and obstacles into distribution, though,
it's simply wasteful.
2.

Makers

I haven't yet spoken to the interests of a second sort of intermediary,
which, historically, has found copyright law to cause significant problems.
This is the group of people and businesses who make instruments, devices,
and services designed for the enjoyment of copyrighted works. This category
comprises trumpets, pianos, violins, radios, televisions, tape recorders,
computers, DVD players, e-book readers, and iPods. The people who make
trumpets are in the business of making money, sometimes lots of money,
from music written by other people. Indeed, their entire business model
depends on the commercial exploitation of other people's music. In
general, instrument makers profit commercially by taking advantage of
readers', listeners', and players' desires to enjoy works created by others.
For most of its history, the copyright law ignored instrument makers.
After all, making and selling a trumpet, or a radio, or a digital video
recorder does not necessarily involve any copying, adaptation, public
performance, or public distribution of works of authorship. But a business
that makes and sells instruments might make a pot of money because of the
demand produced by the creators of copyrighted works. And that money
attracted the attention of copyright owners. Where attention lands, litigation
often follows. The history of copyright law reflects repeated efforts by
copyright owners to bring the manufacture of devices and the sale of services
for enjoying copyrighted works within copyright owners' control. Some of
those efforts failed; others succeeded.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, music publishers filed
unsuccessful copyright infringement suits against the manufacturers of
player pianos and piano rolls. 92 Rebuffed by the courts, music publishers
persuaded Congress to extend copyright in 1909 to encompass control of
"parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical
work."93
When radio broadcasts became common, copyright owners sought to
enjoin broadcasters from unlicensed broadcast of the works, and

91.
I am indebted to Michael Carroll for this insight. See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is
It Anyway?: How We Came To View MusicalExpression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405,
1494-95 (2003).
92.
See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo CO., 209 U.S. I (1908); Kennedy v.
McTammany, 33 F. 584 (D. Mass. 1888); see also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901)
(holding that it is not copyright infringement to make and sell wax cylinders for phonographs).

See Act of Mar. 4, 1gog, ch.

93.
U.S.C.

§§

101-1205

(2006)).

320,

§ 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (current version at 17
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establishments from unlicensed use of radios on their premises. The lawsuits
generated a confusing array of conflicting decisions.94 When courts
assimilated either the radio broadcast or the use of a radio on commercial
premises to a live musical performance, they held for the music publisher;95
when, instead, they assimilated it to a device or service assisting the listener,
they held it non-infringing.96
The notion that instrument makers should be held legally responsible
for deriving a parasitic benefit from copyrighted works gained traction in
the mid-twentieth century with the ubiquity of jukeboxes.97 Under the i go9
Copyright Act, unlicensed public performances of music using jukeboxes
were exempt from copyright liability.98 Copyright owners insisted that the
exemption promoted "legalized piracy of music byjukeboxes,"99 and urged
Congress to close the loophole. A sponsor of an unsuccessful 1959 bill
seeking to remove the statutory jukebox exemption explained: "The basic
theory behind this legislation is that everybody who makes a profit from the
use of musical or literary property should pay his fair share." 00 Despite the
Copyright Office's support, that jukebox bill and others like it failed to
overcome political opposition.'
In 1976, motion picture studios relied on the same basic theory in filing
suit against Sony for marketing the Betamax home video recorder. o2 The
studios argued that Sony's Betamax machines enabled individual consumers

94. See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 19 26);Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co.,
298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924),

rev'd, 5 F.2d 411

(6th Cir. 1925); M. Witmark & Sons v.

Bamberger Co., 291 F. 776 (D.NJ. 1923). Early radio broadcaster defendants were often
manufacturers or sellers of radio receiving sets who operated broadcast stations to promote the
sale of their radios. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Accessories CO., 298 F. at 629.
95. Buck v.Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829.
96. Debaum, 4o F.2d 734; Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929), rev'd sub nom.
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191; see alsoTwentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
97. See generally Authorizing Royalties for Musical Compositions on Coin-Operated Machines:
Hearingon H.R. 5921 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1959)
[hereinafter Authorizing Royalties].
98. See Act of Mar. 4, § 1(e). See generallyJessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 337, 350-54 (2002).

99.
100.

Authorizing Royalties, supra note 97, at 3.
Id. at 6 (remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler).

ioi. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REvISION BILL 59-61 (1965). The jukebox exemption remained in
the law until 1976, when it was replaced by a lightly enforced compulsory license at a nominal
$8 annual rate. Congress replaced the compulsory license with a voluntary blanket license in
1989 when it ratified the Berne Convention. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 16 (2006).
102.
See generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT
CAUSED (2002).
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to copy the studios' television programs without the studios' consent. Any
unlicensed copy, they argued, infringed their copyrights. Because it made
and sold machines designed to make those copies, Sony should be held
liable. 0 3 The United States Supreme Court rejected the theory:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the
elected representatives of the millions of people who watch
television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for
later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against
the sale of machines that make such copying possible. 0 4
In 1991, however, copyright owners filed a suit on a similar theory to enjoin
the sale of digital audio tape recorders. 105 To persuade plaintiffs to drop the
suit, consumer electronics manufacturers agreed to support legislation
obliging the makers and sellers of digital audio recording devices and media
to implement copy-protection technology and to pay royalties to compensate
copyright owners for forgone sales.10 6 The 1992 Audio Home Recording Act
implemented this compromise.o 7
In the ensuing years, statutory and regulatory provisions reaching
makers, and suits to hold them liable as contributory infringers, have
become familiar. In 1998, the Recording Industry Association of America
filed an unsuccessful copyright infringement suit to enjoin the sale of the
first portable MP 3 player.10 8 The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
incorporated both narrow requirements that instrument makers implement
copy-protection technology and broad prohibitions on making, selling,
trafficking in, or providing instruments that might facilitate infringing acts
by defeating copy-protection technology.10 9 Some copyright owners
maintain that Internet service providers should be obliged to redesign their
architecture to incorporate infringement-prevention technology." 0 This

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal.
103.
19 7 9 ), rev'd, 65 9 F.2d 963 ( 9 th Cir. 19 81), rev'd, 4 64 U.S. 4 17 (1984).
104. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
105. Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. go-CIV- 4 5 37 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jul. 9, 1990).
io6. See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, Pt. I (1992).
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, so6 Stat. 4237 (1992)
107.
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§§

1001-1010 (2oo6)). One of the law's provisions prohibits

copyright infringement suits against consumers for noncommercial copying of musical
recordings; the scope of that provision remains controversial.
io8. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp.
2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 18o F.3 d 1072 (gth Cir. 1999). The court refused to enter the
injunction. 18o F. 3 d at io8i.
1og.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. H§ 1201-1332).

105-304, 112 Stat. 2680 (1998)

1lo.
See Saul Hansell, Bits Debate: Should Internet Service ProvidersBlock Coyrighted Works, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2008, 11:41 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/o/15/bits-debateshould-internet-providers-block-copyrighted-works; Mehan Jayasuriya, Jef Pearlman, Robb
Topolski, Michael Weinberg & Sherwin Siy, Forcingthe Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering
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expansion in the scope of copyright has encouraged copyright owners to
insist that making money from copyrighted works should be actionable
without regard to whether the entity earning the money is invading the
copyright owners' express statutory prerogatives by actually reproducing,
publicly distributing, or publicly performing their works.
There are a variety of troubling developments associated with this
particular trend. First, the effort to hold makers liable as contributory
infringers for facilitating enjoyment of works of authorship in unauthorized
ways has required copyright owners to claim that the readers, listeners, and
viewers who make use of the new devices and methods are direct infringers.
The alleged direct infringers are not themselves before the court and cannot
argue that their uses are within the law, and the defendant-makers have
only limited incentives to argue on their behalf."' That has resulted in
inexorable rights-creep as courts assume without deciding, or decide without
reflecting, that a variety of personal uses violate the copyright law.' " The
legal cloud on profiting from new devices or services that enable enjoyment
of works of authorship, meanwhile, deters investment in businesses that
might further copyright's core goals by increasing the audience for works of
authorship or the value of paying to enjoy them."3 Those new opportunities
may eat into the market share of the businesses that currently dominate the
dissemination of works of authorship, but may also encourage greater
dissemination and enjoyment of extant works as well as the creation of new
ones. It makes little policy sense, then, to give the businesses that currently
dominate the market for works of authorship the ability to prevent the
development of new instruments, at least absent a persuasive showing that
makers were reaping too much and creators or distributors too little under
the current allocation of rights, such that a simple wealth transfer would
improve the health of the system. We have never given copyright owners the
right to control the sale, purchase, or use of pencils, crayons, paper, scissors,
or glue, despite the near-certainty that sometimes they will be used to
commit infringing acts. The same principle should apply to circuit boards,
transistors, and electrons.

Is Not a Viable Solution for U.S. ISPs, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (2009), http://wwwpublicknowledge.
org/pdf/pk-filtering-whitepaper-200907.pdf.
1i11. Defendants who worry that a court may be reluctant to leave copyright owners with no
remedy may determine that throwing non-party alleged direct infringers under the bus is a
better strategy than insisting that no infringement has occurred. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3 d 121, 130-33 (2d Cir. 2oo8); Perfect to, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3 d 1'46, 116o-63 (9th Cir. 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d ogg (C.D. Cal. 2009).
i12. E.g., MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 925-27 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3 d 1004, 1014-19 ( 9 th Cir. 2001); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 7 5 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999).
113.
(2oo8).

See Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829
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SUMMARY

The current copyright statute is long, complicated, and difficult to
understand. It instantiates a copyright system that places daunting obstacles
in front of creators who seek to author works and convey them to audiences.
A host of amendments and expansive court rulings have gradually shrunk
the zone of liberty within which readers, listeners, and viewers are free to
enjoy works. Distributors face the threat that cheap, easy, digital copying will
undermine their business models at the same time as they find that licensing
has become complicated and expensive. Makers of new devices and services
for enjoying copyrighted works, meanwhile, face threats of ruinous
litigation. As a result, many members of the public who are being called
upon to follow the extant copyright rules in their daily lives have decided
that the rules are unfair or unreasonable, or that they don't in fact do what
they're claimed to do. The erosion in copyright's legitimacy is itself
problematic for the health of the copyright system.
II. COPYRIGHT REFORM REALISM

The problems I've just raised are not the major focus of current efforts
to stake out positions in connection with future copyright reform."4
Instead, representatives of major copyright players currently seem to see
statutory reform as an opportunity to cement their most heroic (by which I
mean least plausible) victories' '5 and reverse their unanticipated defeats." 6

114. Copyright scholars have, in fact, made a number of thoughtful proposals for recasting
copyright law to give greater benefit to authors or to the public. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Ginsburg,

supra note 64, at 286-88; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003); Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest
Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. g81 (2007); Pamela
Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551. As far as I can
discern, none of these proposals seems to have attracted serious legislative attention.
115. E.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1i8 F. 3 d 199 (4 th Cir.
1997) (holding that making a copy available for patrons to view in a non-circulating library
violated the distribution right); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 6o F. 3 d 913 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that photocopying articles for scientific research purposes was not fair use);
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9 th Cir. 1993) (holding that turning on
a computer violates the reproduction right of the owner of the copyright in the operatingsystem software); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp.
2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that downloading a recorded music file does not perform it).
1i16.
E.g., Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,485 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (holding that
downloading a recorded music file does not perform it). The usual outcome is for the two sides
to agree on legislation that accepts the general principle underlying the heroic, implausible
victory while rejecting its application in factual situations similar to those presented in the
lawsuit. See Litman, supra note 59, at 592-93. Thus, MAI Systems Coip., 991 F.2d 511, held that a
computer-maintenance service made infringing copies of software when it turned on computers
to service them. The holding was a surprising and controversial reading of the statutory
language. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII IntellectualPropertyReport, COMMs.
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There's little serious attention paid to the idea that we may be able to build
a cheaper, more efficient, and better distribution system for copyrighted
works without bribing intermediaries by first endowing and then divesting
creators. Most industry proposals to reform copyright law to accommodate
networked digital technology are taking the opposite approach: they seek to
broaden distributor rights and augment distributor control to compensate
for the supposed decrease in copyright owner incentives effected by the
threat of cheap and abundant unlicensed copies." 7
The gist of many of the proposals currently making the rounds is to
shore up weaknesses in the positions of established distributors and to
strengthen their claims against makers and other intermediaries as well as
readers, listeners, and viewers. Thus, some copyright owners support
replacing the convoluted and outdated licensing provisions in the statute
with language that would streamline licensing when they seek licenses, while
requiring their permission when others seek licenses from them.'" 8 Others
seek to enhance copyright-owner control over uses of copyrighted works, to
enable owners to monetize, or at least monitor, any uses that have value.19
These ideas would extend copyright rights and enforcement to myriad
personal uses, including uses that are noncommercial and nonpublic, on the
theory that copyright should enable copyright owners to profit from and
control all valuable uses of their works.12 0
The story told in support of these efforts is that networked digital
technology poses a fundamental threat to the copyright system, by making it
easy and cheap for individuals to make multiple perfect copies of works in
digital formats and to distribute those copies all over the world.' 2' The
OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21. As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress
enacted an express exemption for computer-maintenance services to turn on computers to
service them, but, bowing to industry pressure, didn't repudiate the surprising general
conclusion that turning on a computer, without more, could constitute infringement of the
copyright in the computer's operating-system software. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006).
See, e.g., Karen Dearne, Secrecy Claims on 8Copyright Treaty, AUsTRALIAN IT, Aug. 19, 2008,
117.
http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/O,24 97,24202770-501 o3 4 4 ,oo.html.
1 18. See generally Section 115 of the Copyright Act, supra note 85; Internet Streaming of Radio
Broadcasts, supra note 85. This posture has made resolution of the music and sound recording
licensing provisions of §§ 114 and 115 elusive.
See, e.g., Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform
1ig.
Parityfor the 21st Century: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProp. of
the H. Comm. on thefudiciary, so8th Cong. 1-3 (2007) (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 31-33
(testimony of Judy Collins, recording artist); An Update: Piracy on University Networks, supra note
51, at 1-3 (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 6-8 (testimony of Cary Sherman); Content
Protection in the DigitalAge: The Broadcast Flag, High-Definition Radio, and the Analog Hole: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
sogth Cong. 6-8 (2005) [hereinafter Content Protection in the Digital Age] (testimony of Dan
Glickman); id. at 11-13 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, RIAA).
120. See Litman, supra note 59, at 595-99.
121. See Ginsburg, supra note 81; see also, e.g., Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003:
Hearing on H.R. 2517 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
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cheap and easy availability of unlicensed copies is said to have severely
undermined the copyright incentive by depriving copyright owners of
control of the mass distribution of their works.12 2 Unless we repair the leaks
in the copyright dike, some copyright owners claim, authors will be reluctant
to create new works and publishers, motion picture companies, and record
labels will be reluctant to make the investment in distributing them.12 3 Thus,
it is essential to augment available legal tools to restore copyright owner
control over the making and distribution of copies of works, and (they
continue) we have in fact bound ourselves to do just that in signing
intellectual property treaties with our trading partners. 2 4 At the same time,
they insist, copyright owners are entitled to the benefit of new forms of
revenue that networked digital technology makes available, and the
copyright statute should clarify that control of those new uses belongs, and
should belong, to the owners of the copyright.12 5
It's worth questioning the premises that underlie this story, which
embodies what I described earlier as the "conventional law-and-economics
view of copyright,"12 6 under which distributors are essential copyright actors
and their interests simultaneously align with the interests of creators and of
readers, listeners, and viewers. Whether strong distributor rights benefit
either creators or readers is an empirical question that has not yet been
subject to empirical testing.12 7 It has some intuitive appeal. It is politically
convenient if one happens to be a lobbyist for a distributor. This notion has
justified a relentless aggrandizement of distributors' copyright rights over
the past 1oo years. In that period, the scope of copyright has expanded

Comm. on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. 61-66 (2003) (testimony of Maren Christensen, Vice
President, Intellectual Property Counsel, Universal Studios).
122. See, e.g., Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law-Ignore at Your Own Peril,
PCWORLD (July 30, 2003, 3:oo AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/i16 5 7/full
disclosure-copyright_1awignoreatyourown-peril.html.
123. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 81-86; Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege:
Reflections ofan In-House Counsel, 53J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 387 (2006).
124. See, e.g., joint Study on 17 US.C Sections 109 and i17: Public Hearing Before the U.S.
Copyright Office and the Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (2000), available at http://www.copyright.
Metalitz,
of
Steven
(testimony
gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/transcript.pdf
representing American Film Marketing Association and six other trade groups); Brief of
Americans for Tax Reform as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance at 1520, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F-3 d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 0714 8o-cv(L), 07-151

1-cv(CON)),

2007 WL 61oi6oo.

125. See, e.g., Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts, supra note 85, at 37-39 (testimony of
Steven M. Marks, General Counsel, RIAA). See generallyJulie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1998) (critiquing
argument).
126.
See PATRY, supra note 3o, at 62; Cohen, supra note 125; Zimmerman, supra note 29;
supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
127.
See PATRY, supra note 3o, at 62; David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism,69 Mo.
L. REv. 1, 2-7 (2004); Zimmerman, supra note 29.
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enormously.'28 The bulk of that expansion has enriched copyright
intermediaries, rather than creators and readers.129 If apologists for
distributors are right that creators and readers benefit indirectly from any
enhancement in distributors' copyright rights, then enhancing their
copyright rights still further should automatically enrich us all. If the
realities of the copyright system undermine its resemblance to the simple
law-and-economics model, on the other hand, the only thing we may end up
enhancing by such a course is what economists refer to as "deadweight
loss." 1 3 0 The deficiencies of the copyright system I outlined earlier for the
creators and readers it is designed to serve may be due at least in part to a
misallocation of copyright benefits-giving intermediaries more control
over the dissemination and enjoyment of works than makes sense in a
networked digital world.
If the current, modest share of copyright that creators enjoy suffices to
inspire continued authorship, and the current modest degree of reader,
listener, and viewer liberties suffices to encourage enjoyment of the works
that creators produce, one might ask: what work is being done by all that
money in the middle? Perhaps the incentives the current copyright system
offers for intermediaries to invest in the production and dissemination of
works of authorship are simply excessive in a digital world.131 Maybe the
prospect of hefty monopoly rents has encouraged distributors to spend
heavily on efforts to constrain the market for competing works or competing
channels of distribution. Oversize distributor incentives might be
reinforcing impulses to keep less profitable works from the public to
enhance the opportunity to market more profitable works. Such a system
may be encouraging wasteful investment in digital-rights-management
technology. Indeed, if distributor incentives are excessive, one might expect
that to inspire a hideously expensive series of lobbying efforts to craft
copyright provisions that will serve as effective entry barriers to competing
media. That's as good a description of the current efforts at copyright
reform as any. Would the copyright system function as a healthier ecosystem
if we just got rid of all that extra incentive?

See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 54-80 (2oo8). "Compared
128.
with their early American counterparts, current copyright holders enjoy a capacious bundle of
rights in many more uses of many more types of published works for a far greater time and with
fewer preconditions." Id. at 55.
129. During the fifteen to twenty years that digital dissemination has emerged as a viable
alternative to distribution of hard copies using factories, store-fronts and trucks, the copyright
owner's legal control over potential uses of protected works has grown, rather than ebbed,
through a massive, almost entirely non-statutory, expansion of the scope of copyright rights. See
id. at 6o-8o; Litman, supra note 59, at 593-96.

130.

See, e.g.,Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801-04

(2000).

See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
131.
the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 870-93 (2001).
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Suggestions that the sticks in the copyright bundle are already thicker
than they should be commonly meet an incentive-based objection to any
reduction in the scope, depth, strength, or duration of copyright rights.
Diminishing copyright, we are told, will decrease authors' incentives to
create and distribute new works, leaving readers, listeners, and viewers with
fewer new works to enjoy.132 The copyright incentive story turns out to be

cloudier than its proponents admit. As David McGowan has succinctly
argued, the economic justification for any particular copyright rule rests on
instinct and guesswork.133 The economic rationale for copyright law
ascended to the status of an article of faith in the absence of any empirical
validation. It may be that in the wake of the 1998 statute increasing the
duration of all copyrights by twenty years,134 publishers increased the
advances paid to authors, and motion picture studios gave their
screenwriters a raise. It could be that, in response to the 1995 Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,1 35 musicians greatly increased
the quality of their musical recordings. As Professor McGowan puts it: "We
do not have the data, so we cannot do the math, so we cannot say for
6

sure."'3

A wise approach to copyright revision might inspire us to rethink the
model. If both creators and readers are ill-served by distributor-centric
copyright, and if the economics of digital distribution now make it possible
to engage in mass dissemination without significant capital investment,
perhaps it is time to reallocate the benefits of the copyright system. The
consolidation of control in distributors' hands does not appear to have
made life easier or more remunerative for creators. Copyright lobbyists have
not shown that recent enhancements to copyright have made it easier or
more rewarding for readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy copyrighted
works. Perhaps the classic picture of copyright is too far removed from its
reality to be useful.
Instead of asking how to enhance copyright owner control, I suggest, we
ought to be asking why.'37 Does a particular proposed enhancement of
copyright-owner prerogatives seem likely to expand opportunities for

See, e.g., I. Fred Koenigsberg, The Ffih Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture:
132.
Humpty Dumpty in Copyrightland,51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 677, 689 (2004).
133.

McGowan, supra note 127; accord Cohen, supra note 125.

134. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112
Stat. 2827, 2827-29 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1994) to extend the term of copyright
protection for most works to life plus seventy years).
135.

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109

Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§§

114-115 (2006)).

136. McGowan, supra note 127, at 26. If people in the copyright-lobbying business believed
that such an effect could be demonstrated, you'd expect them to try to collect the data, but
perhaps they don't believe that Congress needs any persuasion on the point.
137.

See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IowA L. REV. 6og, 664

(2006); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (2007).
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creators or improve reader, listener, or viewer enjoyment of copyrighted
works? Is it likely to make the copyright system simpler, more effective, or
more transparent? Does it seem to be designed to shore up copyright's
apparent legitimacy? If not, it is liable to make the current mess worse
instead of better.
If a copyright system is intended to encourage creation, dissemination,
and enjoyment of works of authorship, it might make sense to redraw the
lines with the purpose of putting fewer burdens than current law on
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment. This seems like a dangerous idea to
those deeply steeped in current copyright practice, because burdening
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment is an important way in which
copyright is thought to "promote the Progress of Science." That approach
requires us to reject the notion that robust use is somehow inconsistent with
or undermining of the goals of copyright. Robust use is itself a core goal of
copyright-encouraging it is the reason we have come to allow distributors
so much control. If, in fact, extensive distributor control of copyrighted
works is not clearly advancing the interests of either creators or readers, it
seems likely that our ideas of how the system actually works need to be
rethought.
III. THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT REFORM
There appears to be a broad consensus among scholars and journalists
that what Jane Ginsburg has called "greed" has undermined copyright's
legitimacy.38 Some copyright professionals comfort one another with the
assertion that appearances deceive; the alleged illegitimacy is really nothing
of the sort. It is instead, they might argue, the combination of the voices of
noisy teenage pirates, who think they should get something for nothing, with
the misguided critiques of copyright academics.'39 The fact that mainstream
media everywhere have recently come to question whether copyright has
become unmoored from its constitutional purpose,140 they suggest, misstates

138.

Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 61; see, e.g., Editorial, We Aren't All Pirates, L.A. TIMES, July

10, 2006, at Bio.
139.

See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 30-39, 213-14; Horbaczewski, supra note 123, at

393; Internet Anti-Piracy Task Force, Nat'l Music Publishers Ass'n, The Engine of Free
Expression: Copyright on the Internet, http://web.archive.org/web/2oo5-200 4 re_/http://
www.nmpa.org/musicioi/copyrights.asp.
140. See, e.g., Editorial, Buyer Beware: Music, Technology Industries Reach an Agreement That
Neglects Consumers' Rights, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2003, at A8; Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at Ai 6; Editorial, Grokster and the Information Exchange, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2004, at A 18; Editorial, The Genuine Article: Appealing to Consumers' Better Nature May Be
a More Effective Way To Curtail Rampant Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at M2; Editorial, Tune
in FairnessforBroadcast Music: Artists, BroadcastersShould Work Togetherfor Solutions, DETROIT FREE
PRESS,June 14, 2oog, at 28A; Steven Levy, Info with a Ball and Chain, NEWSWEEK,June 23, 2003,
at 59; Music Industry Fight To Block Net Access Hits New Lows, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2002, at 22A.
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real popular opinion, which supports copyright (or would, if we only
exposed our children to their copyright education programs' 4 1 ).
My intuition is that Ginsburg was right when she suggested that the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term extension bill, which added twenty years to the
term of all extant copyrights and vested that extended term in the copyright
proprietor rather than the author, would paradoxically weaken copyright by
undermining public support for the entire enterprise.'14 I suspect that
copyright appears most legitimate to the general public when it most
transparently and directly serves its core goals of encouraging authorship
and enjoyment of copyrighted works. The copyright story that the public is
eager to invest in is a story about authors and readers. I can't prove this; I
have no more data than the conventional copyright economic theorists who
suggest that it makes little difference whether the copyright law gives the
goodies to creators, readers, or the distributors between them, but I believe
it to be true. (Lobbyists for major copyright players appear to believe it to be
true as well, since they cast their arguments to Congress for more expansive
copyright rights in appealing claims made on authors' and readers'
behalf.) '43 If I'm right, recent efforts to persuade Congress and the public
that the copyright law has never incorporated "user rights" 44 are short
sighted and counter-productive. The public's fascination with "fair use
rights," bemoaned by some members of the copyright bar,145 is in fact a sign
of broad public acceptance of and support for copyright laws, when
copyright laws are understood as embodying readers' rights as well as
authors' rights.
I also believe, but can't prove, that the deterioration in public support
for copyright is the gravest of the dangers facing the copyright law in a
digital era. Copyright stakeholders have let copyright law's legitimacy

See William Patry, Non-profit, Non-partisan Education in Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT
141.
BLOG (Sept. 12, 2007, 7:53 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/og/non-profit-nonpartisan-education-in.html.
See Symposium, The Constitutionalityof Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long,
142.
,8 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 651, 701 (zooo); see also Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65.
143. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act, supra note 58, at 4-6, 36-38 (testimony of Sheila
Escovedo, Recording Artist, MusicFIRST Coalition).
See, e.g., David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright
144.
Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 345 (2005); Koenigsberg, supra note 132; Randy Picker, Fair
Use v. FairAccess, 31 COLUM.J.L. & ARTs 603 (2008); Patrick Ross, The Remix Culture, COPYRIGHT
ALLIANCE BLOG (July 7, 2008, 2:50 PM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2oo8/o7/theremix-culture/.
145. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 144, at 381 ("Time and again, congressional hearings
have been tainted with the indefensible agendas of those who have a thinly concealed interest
in decreasing copyright protection."); Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 679 ("[E]nemies of
creativity ... speak of the fair use 'right.' But there is no 'right' to fair use."); Patrick Ross,
Perspective: Fair Use Is Not a Consumer Right, CNET (Sept. 6, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Fairuse-is-not-a-consumer-right/2010-10 3 0-3-6205977.html.
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crumble (or have undermined it with ill-considered campaigns'4 6 and
strategic blunders),1 47 while comforting themselves with the promise that
soon, technology would allow them to actually prevent copyright
infringement rather than merely to forbid or deter it. '48 The lack of public
support for copyright norms, then, would soon lose much of its bite, as
people rushed to the stores to buy devices that would decline to make
infringing copies or to play infringing content. I alluded earlier to the costs
of such a strategy: burdening reader, listener, and viewer enjoyment of
works by encasing the works in technology that meters and monitors
exposure undermines one of copyright's essential goals. A dozen years into
the digital rights management ("DRM")'49 experiment, moreover, it seems
clear that it has not yet made a meaningful dent in copyright infringement
of works released in DRM-protected forms. DRM has proved so far to be easy
enough to hack to function as the sort of speed bump that is no impediment
to deliberate infringers but still frustrates legitimate listeners when they try
to play the music they bought on iTunes on their Palm Pre.'5 0
Circumvention tools are widely available, and widely perceived as

146. Different scholars have different nominations for which campaigns were the most
counterproductive. My own list includes Sony's rootkit, see Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges, FED.
TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/o1/sony.shtm, the effort to
expand the distribution right under § 1o6(3) to encompass "making available," seeJane C.
Ginsburg, Separatingthe Sony Sheepfrom the Grokster Goats, 5 0 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 578 n.L (2o8),
and the "John Doe" lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file sharers, see, e.g., Capitol Records
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. o6-1497 (MJD/RLE), 2009 WL 1664468 (D. Minn.June 11, 2009).
147. Here, I would point to the prosecution of Dmitry Skylarov and the threat to sue Ed
Felten and his research team for presenting a scholarly paper on the team's decryption research
on the Secure Digital Music Initiative's technologies. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.
Supp. 2d i si (N.D. Cal. 2002); Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Case No. CV-01-266 9
(D.N.J. filed June 6, 2001).
148. See Content Protection in the Digital Age, supra note 11g, at 6-8 (testimony of Dan
Glickman); Jeffrey Cunard, Technological Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright
Management Systems: A Brief Survey of the Landscape, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO
COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AIAI CONGRESSJUNE 13-17, 2001 (Jane C. Ginsburg &June

M. Besek eds., 2002), available at http://www.alai-usa.org/2001 conference/presscunard.doc;
Lionel S. Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 667 (2003).

149. Copyright owners have used digital rights management technologies since the earliest
days of digital distribution. In 1998, Congress added provisions to title 17 prohibiting the
circumvention of DRM technologies designed to control access to works and prohibiting the
marketing of devices or the provision of services to circumvent a wider category of DRM
technologies. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz,
Should Copyright Owners Have To Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures , 6 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2007).

150. See Larry Magid, Podcast: iTunes Cuts Off Palm Pre Sync, CNET (July 16, 2009), http://
news.cnet.com/8 3 o1-19 5 8_ 3 -10288o4-238.html; Charlie Sorrel, Sync Your Palm Pre with
iTunes. Again, WIRED (July 17, 2009), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2oo9/07/sync-yourpalm-pre-with-itunes-again/.
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legitimate,'5' despite the provisions in § 1201 of title 17 making it illegal to
"circumvent a technological measure" or to "manufacture, import, offer to
the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part" designed to help one to do so. 1 5 2 We face a real
danger that by the time the content industries realize that technological
protection measures cannot be effective without public consensus that they
work to achieve sensible goals by reasonable means, the public will have
decided that much of copyright law is neither sensible nor reasonable.
Real copyright reform should seek to make the copyright system more
effective and to enhance its legitimacy. I believe that in order to accomplish
that, reform should focus on four interrelated goals: radical simplification,
creator empowerment, reader empowerment, and disintermediation.
A.

RADICAL SIMPLIFICATION

I have banged this drum before, repeatedly.'SS The copyright law is
long, complex, counterintuitive and packed with traps and pitfalls, some of
which were inserted intentionally to trip unwary new entrants, hapless
authors, or pesky potential competitors.154 Market leaders in the
entertainment and information businesses have learned to use copyright
legislation as an opportunity to erect market barriers to block their nascent
competition.'55 That may be an unavoidable by-product of our copyright
lawmaking process, but it's hard to argue that it's an advantage we should try
to preserve. Millions of dollars spent by readers, listeners, and viewers to pay
for opportunities to enjoy copyrighted works are absorbed by our
mechanisms for collection and distribution before more than token
amounts make it into creators' pockets. That, too, is a disadvantage rather
than an advantage of our legacy copyright system. Finally, the fact that legacy
copyright rules bind ordinary people engaging in everyday transactions, but
are too complicated to explain to them, is nothing for us to be proud of. If
we can find the political will to change these facts of copyright, we should do
so; they are artifacts of a nineteenth- and twentieth-century copyright system
whose major raison d'tre is that it has taken copyright lawyers a long time

See, e.g., Walter Mossberg, Some Cures for the Multiple iPodBlues, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14,
151.
2oo6, at 30 ("[Hlere's how to use an iPod to copy music to multiple computers."); Sorrel, supra
note 150 (reviewing third-party workarounds to enable Palm Pre owners to use iTunes); Mac the
Ripper, GusTAVUs ADOPLHUS COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac-theRipper (last visited
Sept. 17, 2010) (explaining that the college has installed software for ripping DVDs to the hard
drive of a computer "so that you can copy it" on machines in its media center).
152.
153.

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(i)(A), (a)(2), (b)(s).
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,

50-52 (1994).

17

U.S.C.

§§

112, 203, 304, 1008.

154.

E.g.,

155.

See Litman, supra note 59, at 593-94.
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to learn to work with it, and we are loathe to lose our investment in time and
intellectual exertion.
Copyright lawyers have great affection for the arcane bits of the current
system. Knowing how to navigate distinctions that make no apparent sense

proves our membership in a priestly class of copyright-knowers. The
arcaneness of the rules is tolerable when the club of copyright rule followers
is small. If we are going to insist that the rules apply more broadly, though,
we need to make them sensible, and a necessary first step is to make them
simpler. We don't actually need seven different copyright rights, each with
its own subject matter limitations, scope, and exceptions.'5 6 If you tell the
owner of a sports bar that the copyright statute allows him to operate up to
six television sets in his sports bar so long as the picture is turned off, but
only one television set if the picture is turned on,'5 7 he will understandably
tell you that the law is loony. Nor should we be proud of our bouquet of
compulsory licenses, each with its own distinct terms, procedures, rates,
conditions, and its own collection and disbursement process.'5 8
There are statutory sections so complex that even copyright experts
claim not to understand them.' 5 9 Unless our goal is to make it impossible
for creators, distributors, and readers to navigate the copyright system
without representation, there's no excuse for that.
B.

CREATOREMPOWERMENT

In Part I, I explored some of the problems the current copyright system
poses for creators. Using the copyright reform opportunity to remake the
copyright system into a more creator-friendly scheme could enhance both its
156. See 17 U.S.C. §§1 o6, 1o6A, 1o7-122.
157. Compare id. § 1'0( 5 )(A) (permitting the public performance of a broadcast on a single
receiving set of the sort found in private homes), with id. § 1 10( 5 )(B) (permitting the public
performance of the broadcast of only non-dramatic musical works using multiple speakers and
display screens).
See id. §§ 11s(d), 112(e), I1 4 (d), 115, I18, 11g, 122; see also id. § 116 ("negotiated"
158.
jukebox license).
159. E.g., id. § 114 ("[s]cope of exclusive rights in sound recordings"). Former Register of
Copyrights Ralph Oman had this to say:
Somewhere in this favored land a copyright Pooh-bah really understands
Section 111 (eight pages covering secondary transmissions by cable), Section 114
(18 pages covering the scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings and, now,
webcasting), Section 115 (almost.seven pages covering the compulsory license for
making and distributing phonorecords, including digital delivery), and Sections
119 and 122 (almost 17 pages covering secondary transmissions by satellite). The
current Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, has stated publicly that there are
large chunks of Section 114 that are utterly incomprehensible to most people,
because over the years Congress has spliced and diced them, and then hemstitched
them back together.
Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights of Authors Reborn, 8 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 16g, 172-73 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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legitimacy and its effectiveness in encouraging the creation and
dissemination of works of authorship.
Many European nations cast their copyright law as an "authors' rights"
6
law, and build in a variety of creator-centric rules.1 o In the United States,
we've purported to pursue a different model: our law encourages creators
who wish to exploit their works commercially to assign all rights to an
6
intermediary in return for some amount of money.1

In most cases, the

intermediary distributor will make the work available to the public within a
fairly narrow time window, or will decide not to do so. The work will find its
audience, or not; the initial marketing effort will run its course. For the vast
majority of creators, the works will then enter a dormant phase that will last
6
for the remainder of the copyright term.1 2 Distributors have only modest

incentives to invest real money in exploiting their backlists in new media or
marketing them to new generations.16 3 That is one reason why, before
Congress made copyright renewal automatic, the overwhelming majority of
6
works with registered copyrights were never renewed.1 4
When new opportunities and new media arise, creators who have
assigned their copyrights lack the power to license their works for new uses;
the copyright owners, meanwhile, may see little percentage in exploiting the
new media themselves or in licensing their back catalogues to potential
competitors.165 A large number of works that people still want to read, hear,
and see are unavailable without regard to whether their creators are eager to
exploit them. 166

16o. E.g., Gesetz fiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1273, as amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 26,
2007, BGBL I at 2513, §§ 29-42 (Ger.) (German provisions on transfers and licenses of
copyright); Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual tit. II, ch. III, §§ 14-16 (B.O.E.
1996, 1) (Spain's droit morale), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/basejatos/Admin/
rdlegi- 9 9 6.htnl#.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29.
161.
162.

See, e.g., Orphan Works Fact Sheet, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, http://futureofmusic.

org/article/fact-sheet/orphan-works (last visited Sept. 17, 20 o).
163.
See, e.g., DUKE CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN, ACCESS TO ORPHAN FILMS 1-3
(2005), availableat http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/cspdorphanfilm.pdf

164. See Copyright Renewal Provisions: Hearing on S. 756 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on thejudiciary, lo2d Cong. 25-31 (1991) (statement of
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
165. Some copyright contracts are construed by courts to reserve rights to license uses in
new media, see, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3 d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
Other contracts have express reversion terms, which are common in trade-book publishing
contracts, see RICHARD CURTIS, How To BE YOUR OwN LITERARY AGENT 106-13 (2003), but not
so common in most other fields, see, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 245, 259-61, 392-94, 397See, e.g., TIM BROOKS, SURVEY OF REISSUES OF U.S. RECORDINGS 4-14 (2005), available
166.

at http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pubs33/pub33.pdf; Joel Rose, Copyright Laws Severely
Limit Availability of Music, NPR.ORG (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=51

3 9 5 22&ft=&f=2.
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Creators are in theory entitled to reclaim their copyrights under the
statute's termination-of-transfer provisions.' 6 7 Congress intended the
termination provisions to give authors an opportunity to recapture their
copyrights after their assignees have had a reasonable opportunity to exploit
the assigned rights. 68 In general, thirty-five years after any grant, an author
may notify the grantee that she is reclaiming her rights. The grantee must
receive at least two years notice, and may continue to exploit any derivative
works it created even after the grant is terminated.' 6 9 In the negotiations
leading to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, authors'
representatives pressed to protect their opportunity to recapture their
copyrights from the demands of publishers that they assign any rights in
copyright renewal or extension at the time they signed their original
publication agreements. Distributors received a longer period of time before
termination rights could be executed and express protection for the
continued exploitation of derivative works-both significant improvements
for them over the renewal provisions of the igo9 Act. In return for making
termination inalienable, moreover, publishers and film studios insisted on
making it difficult.1 70 It is, in fact, sufficiently difficult to be largely illusory
for most creators. When Congress extended the duration of copyright in
1976 and 1998, it vested the extended term in the current copyright
proprietor, subject to a similar termination right that has proved similarly
problematic for authors and their heirs.'7' Court decisions, meanwhile, have
167.
17 U.S.C §§ 203, 304(c), 3 04 (d) (2oo6); see Returning Authors Rights: The CC
Termination of Transfer Tool [Beta]: Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS LABS, http://
labs.creativecommons.org/demos/termination/faq.php
(last visited Sept. 17,
201o);
Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under 17 US.C. § 203, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.
copyright.gov/docs/2o 3 .html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
168. U.S. copyright law has since 1831 incorporated provisions designed to allow authors to
recapture their copyrights from assignees. See Barbara Ringer, Study No. 3r: Renewal of Copyright,
in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963). Until 1976,
copyrights expired after an initial term, and the author or the authors' heirs could apply for a
second, "renewal" term, which vested free and clear of initial term assignments. The renewal
provisions, however, were unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, authors and their heirs didn't
understand the provisions well enough to follow the statutory steps. Second, copyright owners
routinely required authors to assign their renewal expectancies at the same time they made
their initial copyright assignment, and courts had upheld the validity of these advance grants.
Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 383 (1960); Fred Fisher Music Co.
v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943). That meant that authors as a practical matter
were unable to recapture their rights. See Ringer, supra.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 891-93 (1987). Authors of older works have a parallel right to terminate
at the beginning of the nineteen-year copyright extension enacted in 1976 and the twenty-year
copyright extension enacted in 1988. 17 U.S.C. § 304170. See Litman, supra note 16g, at 892; Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 683 F.2d 61o (2d Cir.
1982).
See Burroughs, 683 F.2d at 620-31; Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 10 Civ. 141
171.
(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 1655253, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2010); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't,
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d log8, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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narrowed the scope of the rights subject to recapture,172 and upheld
assignee strategies for evading termination by renegotiating the underlying
contract before the date termination becomes available.'73
Thus, we have a system that makes creators' rights easy to assign and
exceptionally difficult to recapture. Depending on the terms of their
copyright assignments, creators commonly have little control over the
exploitation of their works in new markets or media. The detachment of
copyrights from the creators who author works enhances the perception of
copyright as illegitimate and unconnected with the progress of science.'17
Affording creators a mechanism to regain some control of the exploitation
of their works could shore up copyright's legitimacy by strengthening the
connection between creators and copyrights throughout the long copyright
term. It could also give distributors and makers new opportunities to exploit
old works in new ways that older media might deem unprofitable or a poor
fit with extant business models. If reversion is a feature that has value to the
overall copyright system, wise copyright reform should replace the current,
largely illusory termination provisions with a recapture mechanism that
might actually function as advertised.
C.

READER EMPowERME1\rr

Copyright laws have a special place in our jurisprudence. That special
place includes a presumption of First Amendment validity.' 75 In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, the Supreme Court dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, noting that so long as "Congress has
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."'7 6 That seems paradoxical: copyright
laws regulate expression more directly that most laws that routinely undergo
First Amendment review. The key to the paradox is that copyright laws have
traditionally encouraged expression while preserving the liberty to read,
listen, and view the expression copyright protects. The importance of
reading, listening, and viewing is a vital reason that copyright laws get special
treatment. The freedom to read, listen, and view are essential attributes of
human freedom, so much so that we take them for granted. They are

See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1985); Copyright Holder Protection
172.
Act: Hearing on S. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciay, ggth Cong. 40-42 (ig85) (statement of Barbara Ringer); Litman, supra note 169,
at 901-02.

See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F-3 d 193, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2008); Lydia
173.
Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the "Inalienable"Right To Terminate,
62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=161 1256; Scott,
supra note 45.
174.
See PATRY, supra note 3o, at 67-96, 171-75.
175. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
176. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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inextricable from the freedom to think. The liberties to read, listen, and
view are crucial foundational liberties on which all copyright systems are
built. Without those liberties, no copyright system makes any sense.
If copyright law secures rights for readers, listeners, and viewers, where
are they? As I discussed in Part I, those rights have lived, for the most part, in
the white spaces defined by successive copyright statutes. Early copyright
statutes limited copyright owners to the exclusive rights to print, reprint,
publish, and vend-they didn't extend to uses that readers, listeners, and
viewers might make of copyrighted works. So long as copyright laws left
individual readers, listeners, and viewers alone, no conflict arose. When
copyright laws are narrowly drawn, it is easy to forget that readers' interests
have any importance in the copyright scheme. For most of our history,
copyright laws were cast more narrowly than they are today, and this set of
issues came up only rarely. Today, of course, copyright rights are broader,
and conflicts between copyright owners and readers, listeners, and viewers
abound.1 77 Even in the context of today's expansive copyright rights,
though, the statute includes significant white spaces in which readers,
listeners, and viewers are at liberty to enjoy copyright works the way they
want to.'7 8 These white spaces, I would argue, are part of the traditional
contours the Supreme Court mentioned in Eldred-they advance copyright's
goals and the First Amendment by securing liberty to read, listen, look at,
and think. In Lawful Personal Use, I called these reader, listener, and viewer
rights "copyright liberties." They have been embedded in the fabric of U.S.
179
copyright law since its early history and are essential to its design.
As copyright owners have sought to control and monetize individual
uses, though, they have increasingly argued that what readers, listeners, and
viewers think of as user rights are instead contingent privileges extended to
users by copyright owners as a matter of grace and good business sense,
subject to being withdrawn whenever a business reason for doing so
appears. so The general public's disenchantment with copyright law derives
See NETANEL, supra note 128, at 100-53
177.
copyright law places on free speech).

(detailing

the burdens contemporary

SeeLitman, supra note 55, at 1895-1919.
Id. at 1go 4 -o8.
i8o. The most notorious example is the question whether the law permits consumer
copying of recorded music from a CD to a computer or digital playback device. During oral
argument in MGM v. Grokster, Petitioner's counsel made the following representation: "The
record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it's been on their Website for
some time now, that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your
computer, put it onto your iPod." Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, MGM, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 832356 at *14. Ten months later, in a filing
178.

179.

opposing exemptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, the record companies

characterized it somewhat differently: consumers could lawfully copy music to their iPods only
because copyright owners had granted them a revocable privilege to do so. See Ass'n of Am.
Publishers et al., RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Comments at 22 (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.

copyright.gov/1 201/2oo6/reply/si metalitzAAP.pdf ("[C]reating a back-up copy of a music
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in part from copyright owners' insistence that readers, listeners, and viewers
are entitled to no rights under copyright. Express recognition of reader,
listener, and viewer copyright liberties could protect them from
encroachment, and thus help assure that the copyright system is able to
achieve that part of its core purpose. It could also help affirm that copyright
is, indeed, the law that most members of the public would like to believe in.
D. DisvnTERMEDIATION
Simplifying the law to the point that one doesn't need a lawyer to be
able to play, and giving more rights to creators and more freedom to
readers, listeners, and viewers will necessarily reduce the profusion of
incentives currently enjoyed by many distributor intermediaries. As I argued
in Part I, I believe that distributors' current control of the copyright system
is itself a major copyright ill. It derives from an era when distribution was
much more expensive than it can be today. It continues in the twenty-first
century because of the political power of copyright lobbies, aided by
members of Congress eager to be glamoured by famous entertainers and
willing to be persuaded that the only fundamental problem with the United
States economy is widespread piracy of American creations.
The copyright system currently offers incentives to copyright owner
intermediaries that are so substantial that they spend millions of dollars to
lobby Congress to preserve and shore up the status quo. That suggests that
the system tolerates, indeed supports, an embarrassing degree of waste.
Concentrating most of the copyright law's power in the hands of
distributors, though, is not merely wasteful. It is independently corrosive of
the copyright system. Because copyright's current beneficiaries have the
political power to prevent Congress from enacting copyright legislation, they
insist on inserting provisions into new laws that will put their potential
competitors at a disadvantage. Those impediments in the law make it more
difficult for creators to reach audiences, and more difficult for readers,
listeners, and viewers to enjoy works disseminated in new media. They can
make it impractical to introduce works that creators hope to exploit and
readers want to enjoy. A significant reduction in distributor intermediary
incentives might discourage this sort of rent-seeking behavior. Even if it did
not, a law that recasts current intermediaries as optional players in the
copyright scheme would be a more sensible law. The intermediaries who
today control the playing field are, and should be treated as, useful
participants when they offer services that meet creators' and readers' needs,
but no longer necessary in order to navigate the system.
CD is not a non-infringing use."); id. at 22 n.46 ("Nor does the fact that permission to make a
copy in particular circumstances is often or even 'routinely' granted necessarily establish that
the copying is a fair use when the copyright owner withholds that authorization. In this regard,
the statement attributed to counsel for copyright holders in the Grokster case is simply a
statement about authorization, not about fair use." (citations omitted)).
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SUMMARY

Workable copyright reform should almost certainly be reform that
addresses the excesses responsible for copyright law's battered reputation.' 8 '
One important ingredient in such a reform, in my view, is simplicity: as I've
argued elsewhere, the public is far more likely to support a law that seems to
it to be reasonable, fair, and easy to understand.,8 2 Ideally, copyright reform
should also shore up the law's legitimacy by strengthening both the
connections between copyright and creators and the connections between
copyright and readers, listeners, and viewers. To accomplish that, it will need
to dislodge many of the currently entrenched intermediaries who have
united to block reforms that weaken their control. 83 If that requires
changes that end up weakening copyright's current strong incentives for
distributors, all to the good: limiting the excesses of distributor rights may
have its own salutary effects on the copyright system. If the rewards of
exclusivity are smaller, it may no longer be worth distributors' while to invest
large amounts of money and effort in making it more difficult for potentially
competing works and competing media to find their audiences.
IV. REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM
Thus far, I have argued that real copyright reform should seek to
improve the ways that the system works for creators and for readers,
listeners, and viewers. I have suggested that the most important goals of such
a reform are these: We should try to shore up the currently weakened
legitimacy of copyright law. We should seek to make the currently complex
copyright law simple enough that most creators will not need to consult a
copyright lawyer before making and exploiting works of authorship, and
most readers, listeners, and viewers will not need to consult a copyright
lawyer before enjoying them. We should focus on empowering creators and
readers and should, when it is feasible, do that at the expense of copyright
intermediaries, who currently hold a counterproductively massive share of
copyright's goodies. These goals reinforce each other rather than
competing, since a simpler, more creator-reader-centric copyright law will
seem more legitimate and be easier for creators and readers to use; and a
law with enhanced legitimacy will be complied with more readily and will
work more effectively.
There are a variety of ways one could embody these goals in statutory
reform, and copyright commentators have floated imaginative proposals that
would help to achieve these goals in many different ways.1 8 4 I sketch out my

181.

See Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65-67.

182.

See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 1 16-17.
See A Special Conversationwith Marybeth Peters, supra note 13.

183.

184. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note I14, at 199-258 (proposing alternative system for
compensating creators); ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIviY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
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own favorite proposals below. The conventions of legal scholarship offer me
an unfair advantage as compared with copyright lawyers, lobbyists, and
legislative staffers. Because I am fixing my ideas in a law review article, I am
allowed to propose reforms that have no realistic chance of enactment,
solely on the excuse that I believe, and will try to persuade you, that the
reforms I suggest would be wise. I can suggest an agenda of legitimation,
simplification, creator and reader empowerment, and disintermediation
without concerning myself (too much) that the legislative process we rely on
to generate copyright laws ensures that the copyright law is never short, and
never simple. It has not for years reflected concern with appearing to the
public to be balanced, fair, or sensible; it pays shockingly little attention to
the reasonable interests of creators or members of their audiences. Legal
scholars are encouraged to dance in the realm of pure theory, where even
outlandish ideas may be food for someone's thought. Thus, I don't actually
need to worry about the fact that I see no plausible route by which we could
get there from here. I have nonetheless worried long and hard about
coming up with proposals that would actually work, if only we could get
there.
A.

REDEFINE THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT RIGHTS

Copyright rights should secure to creators the right to exploit their
works commercially while assuring that readers, listeners, and viewers have
the ability to enjoy the works in ways that don't involve commercial

LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 69-85, 147-65 (2010) (proposing expansion of moral rights);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN AN INTERCONNECrED

WORLD 250-59 (2001) (proposing short renewable copyright terms, new compulsory licenses,
and absolving defendants of liability if they can prove lack of harm to the copyright owner);
NETANEL, supra note 128, at 195-217 (proposing reforms to facilitate use and preservation of
orphan works and a noncommercial use levy to compensating copyright owners for
noncommercial peer-to-peer file sharing); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1o87, 1122 (2007) (proposing an administrative body with authority to adjudicate fair use
petitions and issue fair use rulings); Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286-88, 301-06 (proposing
copyright amendment giving human creators waivable attribution rights); Mark A. Lemley & R.
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without RestrictingInnovation, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1345, 1410 (2004) (proposing streamlined administrative dispute resolution for small
claims against consumers engaging in infringement over peer-to-peer networks); Loren, supra
note 88, at 703 (proposing replacing six exclusive rights with single "'right to commercially
exploit' the copyrighted expression"); R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music
Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 26873 (2001) (proposing legislation to extend existing compulsory licenses and exemptions to
temporary RAM storage incidental to licensed or exempt uses); Samuelson, supra note 114, at
556 (outlining the provisions of a model copyright law); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 497510 (2009) (proposing amendments to copyright damages provisions); Christopher Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 551 (2004) (proposing the adoption of "new
style" Berne-compliant formalities); Stadler, supranote 67, at 746-57 (proposing amendments to
narrow the scope of the public performance right).
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exploitation. The law now on the books divides copyright into reproduction,
derivative work, public distribution, public performance, and public display
rights,' 85 and encourages authors to dispose of them separately and
piecemeal.' 86 In many copyright industries, it has become conventional for
different copyright rights to be separately controlled by different
intermediaries.' 8 7 As new opportunities to exploit works have arisen, those
intermediaries have insisted that the new uses impinge on the rights they
control instead of or as well as the rights controlled by other
intermediaries. 8 8 Meanwhile, the distinctions among different exclusive
copyright rights have come to seem increasingly inapposite to a networked
digital world. When someone views a website or listens to a song over the
Internet, is she committing a reproduction, a distribution, a performance or
display, or all of them at once?' 89 Is the person responsible for any invasion
of exclusive copyright rights the individual viewer/listener, the owner of the
computer hosting the files, the computer network that enables remote
viewing and listening, or someone else?190 Efforts to find a solution that
would permit prospective licensees to obtain necessary licenses in a single
transaction have failed because entrenched intermediaries cannot agree on
which of them is the appropriate licensor.'9' Congress has been unwilling to
characterize the different exclusive rights as exclusive of each other, rather
than overlapping;' 9 2 courts have been unwilling to apply statutory
exceptions defined in terms of one exclusive right to the same behavior

17 U.S.C. § io6 (2006).
186. 17 U.S.C.§2o(d).
187. The canonical example is music, where the public performance rights are licensed by
performing rights societies, like ASCAP, while music publishers control the reproduction and
distribution rights. See PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 206-38. See generally Music Licensing Reform,
supra note 78.
188. To stick with the music example, ASCAP insists that both transmission of a file
containing recorded music over the Internet and the playing of a music ring-tone on a cellular
phone should be deemed public performances within its purview. Music publishers insist that
the transmission of the files and the sales of ringtones to cell-phone subscribers are not
performances but distributions of copies. See United States v. ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571
185-

(S.D.N.Y.

2009); United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Companies have learned to their peril that licensing the use from one is no defense to a suit for
willful copyright infringement by the other. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (2003).
189. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 88, at 55o-62; Reese, supra note 184, at 240-49.
igo. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F. 3 d 121, 125 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F. 3 d 934 (gth Cir.
2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3 d 811, 815-16 (gth Cir. 2003); ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 565;
ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
191.
See Music Licensing Reforn, supra note 78, at 106-44 (testimony of Marybeth Peters,
U.S. Register of Copyrights).
192. SeeH.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61-65 (1976).
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characterized as impinging on another.'93 Copyright divisibility may have
been intended to empower authors,194 but it has ended up making more
problems than it has solved.195
i.

A Unitary Commercial Exploitation Right?

If simplicity, legitimacy, and author- and reader-empowerment were our
only goals, untempered by past practice, vested rights, and international
obligations, we could do worse than to recast copyright as a single exclusive
right with carefully drawn boundaries. If we chose to define a single core
copyright right, the most promising candidate for that right, in my view,

would be a right to control commercial exploitation.'9 6 Limiting the scope
of copyright to commercial exploitation would be simpler than the current
array of five, six, seven, or eight' 97 distinct but overlapping rights. Copyright

defined as control over commercial exploitation, moreover, would accord
with what we know of the public's understanding of what copyright law does,
and should, reserve to the author.9 8 It would also preserve for readers,
listeners, and viewers the liberty to enjoy works in non-exploitative ways
without seeking licenses for each.
A minority of copyright scholars has long insisted that the exclusive
rights conferred by copyright are already limited, at least implicitly, to
commercial exploitation. Ray Patterson and Judge Stanley Birch make this
point at length in their Unified Theory of Copyright.'99 Others have argued that
uses that are not commercially exploitative should in general be deemed
outside of the copyright owner's control, whether under the fair-use rubric
or otherwise.2oo Still others have argued that whatever rights current law
gives copyright owners, Congress should modify the statute to allow a broad
swathe of noncommercial uses without the copyright owner's permission,

193.

See, e.g., Kelly, 280 F-3 d at 940-44, 947-48; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239

F-3 d 004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).

194. Justice Ginsburg suggested as much in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 49497 (2001).
195. SeeLoren, supra note 88, at 698-701.
196. I have argued elsewhere that replacing the current exclusive rights with a right of
commercial exploitation would improve the copyright law. See LITMAN, supranote 2, at 18,-86;
accord Loren, supra note 88, at 717-18.
197. In addition to exclusive reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, and public
display rights, the current statute gives differently defined public performance rights for sound
recording copyrights and copyrights other than sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § lo6(4), (6)
(2006). Authors of works of visual arts have separate, inalienable attribution and integrity
rights. See id. § 1o6A.
198. SeeJessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing),
29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 253 (1997); Litman, supra note 55, at 1912.

199.
2oo.

Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 293-96, 335-37, 385-95.
E.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REv.

975, 1017-29 (2002).
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either subject to a new copyright exemption or to a new statutory license.20o
Copyright apologists object that the law has never incorporated a privilege
for noncommercial use, broadly defined, and that it should not do so.202
The line between commercial and noncommercial, they continue, is too
elusive to bear so much weight. If a use has no commercial significance, they
say, a copyright owner is unlikely to object.
Although I acknowledge that the line-drawing difficulties are
formidable,2 0 3 I think the difference between commercial exploitation and
noncommercial enjoyment captures a distinction that is fundamental to our
understanding of how the copyright system works. Congress has on multiple
occasions suggested that it views the line between commercial exploitation
and reader, listener, and viewer consumption as an implicit limit on the
scope of copyright rights.2 0 4 Noncommercial uses further the copyright
interest in encouraging enjoyment of works without unduly burdening the
copyright owner's opportunities to earn revenue through commercial
exploitation. Major international copyright treaties bind nations to a
promise to give copyright owners control of reproductions and public
performances, and then permit them broad latitude to exclude
noncommercial uses from the scope of control.2o5 The public tends to view
copyright's legitimate sphere as limited to commercial exploitation. There
seems to be broad public support for allowing creators to control
commercial exploitation, and very little support for allowing copyright
owners to control noncommercial uses.206

201.

202.

E.g., FISHER, supranote 114; Netanel, supra note 114.
See, e.g., Patrick Ross, Live from Digital Hollywood: The Canary is Spain, COPYRIGHT

ALLIANCE BLOG (May 5, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2o1o/o5/livefrom-digital-hollywood-the-canary-is-spain/; Patrick Ross, Seven Sneaky Words on Fair Use,
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/
2010/0 3 /seven-sneaky-words-on-fair-use/; Thomas D. Sydnor II, Thomas on Copyright Reform:
An Injudicious Threat to Consumers and Artists, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found.,
Wash, D.C.), Dec. 2oo8, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2oo8/pop' 5 .18
thomasreform.pdf.
203.
See, e.g., CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING "NON-COMMERCIAL": A STUDY OF HOW THE
ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS "NON-COMMERCIAL USE" 11 (2009), available at http://
mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/Defining-Noncommercial fullreport.
pdf (reporting that both creators and users consider uses that earn money or involve
advertising as commercial, but that there is "more uncertainty than clarity" about whether other
online uses are commercial); cf Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving Role of "ForProfit" Use in
Copyright Law: Lessons from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 255,
269-80 (2010) (describing courts' efforts to construe the "for profit" limitation in the igog
Act).
204.

See Litman, supra note 55, at 1904-07.
See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core InternationalCopyright Norm: The Reverse ThreeStep Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 27-34 (2005).
205.

206.
See, e.g., PAT AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIv., THE GOOD, THE
BAD, AND THE CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT 8 (2007), available
at http://dspace.wrlc.org/bitstream/1 9 61/ 4 612/1/good-bad-confusing.pdf; MARY MADDEN,
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Thus, defining copyright as a right to control commercial exploitation
could give creators meaningful economic rights while preserving their
audiences' freedom to enjoy and interact with works in ways that further
copyright's core objectives. 207 Eliminating the distinctions between the
distinct rights in the copyright bundle, moreover, could give us an
opportunity to oust the current vested intermediaries from their control of
pieces of copyright, and return that power to the creators.
2.

Reality Check

In a world without magic wands, though, recasting copyright as a
unitary right to control commercial exploitation change could easily make a
mess. When applied to extant copyrights, which are already the subject of an
assortment of contracts and licenses, instantly converting all copyrights to a
single commercial exploitation right would upset vested expectations, and
would call into further question our compliance with international treaties
that require us to give authors the right to authorize the reproduction,
translation, performance, or communication to the public of the works they
author.2o 8 Adopting that approach for works not yet fixed in tangible media
of expression would pose more modest transitional issues, but would still
introduce considerable uncertainty. Redefining copyright as an exclusive
commercial exploitation right would provide an opportunity to expand U.S.
copyright rights to include an exclusive right to make a work available to the
public (at least when the "making available" occurred in connection with
commercial exploitation). It would also offer a more compelling rationale
than contributory infringement for imposing liability on makers. Those
tantalizing possibilities might well become a powerful litigation magnet.
Meanwhile, the complications of a hybrid system, treating new works under
new rules while retaining all of the old rules for older works, would easily
defeat any simplification benefits the transition might seek to achieve.
3.

A More Prudent Alternative

Could we capture the benefits of that sort of redefinition without
throwing the copyright world into chaos? I think we could. We could do
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECr, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET 75-77 (2004),

availableat http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/200 4 /Artists-Musicians-and-the-Internet.aspx;
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TULANE J. TECH. &
INTEIL. PROP. 1, 27-33 (2009).

Cf Loren, supra note 203, at 281-84 (suggesting that the scope of copyright's
207.
exclusive rights should be limited by requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendant's use caused
"commercial harm").
208. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 8-9, 1114, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27. We are already arguably in breach of our treaty
obligations because of our failure to grant authors meaningful attribution and integrity rights
and our generous exemption for bars and restaurant to play music without getting a license to
do so. See Gervais, supranote 205, at 14-16; Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 265-66.
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that, I suggest, by adopting a more modest package of changes that reforms
our current regime to make it behave, as much as feasible, as if restricting
the scope of copyright to commercial exploitation were merely the explicit
recognition of a limitation that had always been implicit in the law.2 0 9 We
could accomplish that by adopting a definition of copyright's multiple
exclusive rights that included control over reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, and public performance insofar as they represented
commercial exploitation, but not otherwise. In addition, we could adopt
other changes, also modest, to heal some of the most egregious problems of
the current copyright system. Copyright reform should define the reach of
copyright's exclusive rights to give copyright owners control over uses that
inhabit the core of the commercial exploitation of their work, leaving
noncommercial and non-exploitative uses uncontrolled.
Restricting the scope of copyright rights to uses involving commercial
exploitation will not obviate the need for general privileges and limitations
like the first sale doctrine and fair use. Such limitations arose in litigation
over commercial uses,2 10 and do important work in mediating which
commercial activities should come within a copyright owner's contro12 1 and
which should not.2 1 2 When copyright is restricted to control over
commercial exploitation, however, that should relieve the pressure on the
law's few general privileges to be all things to all people.
If we choose to retain the principle that copyright is divisible into
multiple exclusive rights each capable of separate ownership and control, we
will need to do something to address the licensing logjam that divisible
copyright has engendered. One obvious improvement would be to abandon
the notion that copyright uses require multiple, distinct licenses for each
sort of use. In earlier work, I suggested that it makes sense under current law
to treat as impliedly licensed any reproduction, adaptation, distribution,
performance, or display that is incidental to a licensed use.2 1 3 If we are
reforming the law, we can go further. First, we can allow divisible copyright
ownership without continuing to insist that each fragment of copyright is
distinct and non-overlapping. Any transfer of a part of a copyright should be
understood to carry with it any rights necessary to allow its exercise and
license; entities who own copyright fragments should have a duty to account
209. See, e.g., Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 385-95.
210. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6
(N.D. Cal. 1896).
211. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 8oo
F.2d 5 9 ( 3 d Cir. 1986).
212. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 477 F. 3 d 128
( 4 th Cir. 2007).
213.
SeeLitman, supra note 55, at 1917.
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to one another if they grant a license that invades a different owner's turf,
but it should not be the responsibility of the user seeking a license to track
down and negotiate with all owners. Second, we can adopt a principle that
the creator and initial copyright owner of a work retains residual authority to
license any uses even after assignment of her copyright, subject to a duty to
account to her assignee(s). This will help to ameliorate confusion about
what uses require what licenses from whom, and will at the same time
restore to creators some connection with their copyrights.2 14 To further
empower creators and cut through licensing thickets, we should reform our
current illusory termination of transfers. Finally, we should simply abolish
the current statutory "compulsory" licenses. In the pages that follow, I
explore these proposals in more detail.
If copyright's exclusive rights are limited to uses made in the course of
commercial exploitation, and if licenses are understood to permit uses of
works, rather than of splinters of different exclusive rights, many of the
current pages of prose in the succeeding sections of the statute become
unnecessary. Others may have made sense once, but function today chiefly
to perpetuate the clout. of entrenched intermediaries at creators' and
readers' expense.2 15 Still others distort the copyright system by allowing
older media to exploit copyrighted works on more favorable terms than
newer media.21 6 If copyright's exclusive rights are cast with appropriate
narrowness, we can sweep away the current crop of industry-specific
exceptions, limitations, and complications. We can retain classic general
limits like the idea/expression distinction, the first sale doctrine and fair
use, while leaving narrow specific exceptions behind.
B.

RECONNECT CREATORS WTH THEIR COPYRIGHTS

In Part III, I discussed the problems for copyright's legitimacy that arise
when creators are divested of the copyrights in their works. Authors
complain that they can no longer exploit or license their work, because they

214.
It may once have been the case that it was easier to track down a work's publisher than
to find its author. In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each other's divisions, spin
off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying rate, an author is now far easier to
track down than her assorted assignees, their successors, and their respective assignees. It also
seems more likely that an author will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher
than that a publisher will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when
it purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the authors' contracts.
See, e.g., PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOuRT, DIGITAL MUSIC WARS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
OF THE CELESTJALJUKEBOX 24-37 (Andrew Calabrese ed., 2oo6); ALBERT N. GREcO, THE BOOK
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 51-65 (2d ed. 2005). Thus, plaintiff record companies in Napsterinsisted
that it would be difficult or impossible for them to identify the works on whose behalf they
brought suit. A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F. 3 d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

§ 115

(2006).

215.

E.g., 17 U.S.C.

216.

E.g., id.§§ 111, 112, 114, 119.
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assigned the copyright to an intermediary who refuses to release it.217 In
theory, the termination-of-transfers right should address it, but the
termination right has turned out to be largely illusory. We can reunite
creators with their copyrights and achieve significant disintermediation at
the same time by replacing our current fake termination right with a real
one.21 8 Authors should be entitled to terminate any copyright grant they
make, on five years notice, at any time beginning fifteen years after the date
of the grant and continuing for the life of the copyright. Termination
should continue to be subject, as it is under current law, to an exception
allowing grantees to continue to exploit any derivative works created during
the grant, but not to make new ones. The combination of a five-year notice
period and a derivative works exception should give copyright
intermediaries enough protection to make investment in copyrighted works
worthwhile without vesting them with excessive control. 2 19 Meanwhile, the
potential for termination at an earlier date may encourage intermediaries to
structure their initial agreements for copyright acquisition in more creatorfriendly forms.
C. RECOGNIZE READERS' RIGHTS

Limiting the scope of copyright to commercial exploitation will go a
significant way towards reinvigorating copyright law's traditional solicitude
for readers, viewers, and listeners, and should enable them to enjoy
copyrighted works in both consumptive and creative ways without unduly
undermining the copyright owners' commercial incentives.220 1 would,
however, go further. I believe that it would enhance the legitimacy of the
copyright system if the copyright statute included explicit recognition of the
core importance of reader, listener, and viewer liberties to enjoy copyrighted
works without undue copyright owner interference. If copyright law
expressly recognized that reader, listener, and viewer interests must
See Jonathan Band, Publish and Perish? Protecting Your Copyrights from Your Publisher,
217.
ASCB NEWSLETTER, (Am. Soc'y for Cell Biology, Bethesda, Md.), May 2008, available at http://
www.policybandwidth.com/doc/2oo80523-PublishANDPerishFinal.pdf; Comments of Recording
Artist Groups on Orphan Works, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Mar. 25, 2005), http://futureof
music.org/filing/comments-recording-artist-groups-orphan-works.
See generally KEEP YOUR
COPYRIGHTS, http://www.keepyourcopyrights.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
218.

Other scholars have proposed different reforms that would be useful contributions to

efforts to strengthen the perceived connection between creators and their copyrights, such as
enacting an express attribution right. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286-88.
219. That probably won't prevent some assignees from seeking to avoid termination by
claiming that the works are works made for hire. See, e.g., Sound Recordings as Works Madefor Hire:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 1 o6th
Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights). In order to
safeguard authors' opportunities to exercise their broadened termination rights, we should
probably narrow and perhaps eliminate the category of commissioned works made for hire
under the second prong of the definition in § io.
220.
SeeLitman, supra note 66, at 179--83.
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sometimes be protected against overreaching creators and distributors, it
would be much easier for members of the public to invest in the principle
that copyright should protect creators and distributors from exploitative
readers, listeners, and viewers.
An additional reform that strikes me as useful is the creation of a
position, within the Copyright Office but independent of its bureaucracy, for
a copyright ombudsman to explain the copyright system to the public and
articulate the public's interest to the staff of the Copyright Office and to
Congress. I've explored in earlier work some of the reasons why it has been
difficult for Congress, the Copyright Office, or a variety of copyright-affected
organizations that have purported to speak for the public on particular
issues to represent the public in any reliable way.2 2 1 It may not actually
achieve much to give the job to a lawyer with instructions to consult his
client; different actors' notions of the public interest in copyright are
exceptionally diverse. 2 2 2 But as innovations go, it's an inexpensive one with
the potential to make a difference.
D.

DISLODGEENTRENCHEDINTERMEDIARIES

Assume a willing licensee who desires to license a copyrighted work on
terms that the copyright owner would find acceptable. A functioning
copyright system should make it easy to strike that deal. If the licensee
cannot identify the appropriate licensor or divine the license terms; if the
copyright owner cannot discover who has already exploited her work and
who would like to do so, the system will entail tremendous waste. Where the
value of an individual use is dwarfed by the transaction costs of negotiating a
license, the U.S. copyright system has either completely excused unlicensed
22
uses,2 2 3 or allowed the uses under blanket collective 2 2 4 or statutory 5

SeeLitman, supra note 153, at 53-54; Litman, supra note 9, at 299-301, 31 1-16.
Compare, e.g., Neil Turkewitz, Copyright, Fair Use and the Public Interest, CULTURAL
http://web.archive.org/web/2005o8310 3 3 648/www.cultural
2004),
(Dec.
COMMONS
commons.org/comment-print.cfm?ID=22, with, e.g., PATRY, supra note 3o, at 101-02.
For example, a sports bar publicly performs games broadcast by ABC. The
223.
performance of the music accompanying the broadcast is exempt under 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)
221.

222.

(2006).

For example, the local ABC affiliate broadcasts the game to viewers in its local service
224.
area, having secured blanket performance licenses from ASCAP, BMI and SESAC to broadcast
the music accompanying the game.
For example, Comcast Cablevision transmits the ABC broadcast to its subscribers,
225.
having paid a statutory license fee under 17 U.S.C. § I1 to permit its retransmission. The fee
will be combined with other fees and then divided at the end of the year between motion
picture studios, major sports leagues, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC, and others who claim copyright
ownership in programming transmitted over cable under the § 11 license. See 17 U.S.C.
(D.C. Cir.
§§ 8oi-805; Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Cong., 146 F. 3 d 907, 91-12
1998). A similar regime applies to satellite television. See 17 U.S.C. § g19.A dissimilar and
horribly complex regime covers the digital transmission of recorded music by satellite radio and
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licenses. Collective licenses are devised by performing rights organizations
who operate within constraints imposed by antitrust consent decrees.22 6
Compulsory licenses are statutory, although their terms were devised by
representatives of copyright owners and the statutory licensees before
congressional enactment.2 2 7
Although copyright theorists talk about copyright licensing as an
individually negotiated transaction between a creator and a distributor,'22 8
much licensing of copyright works involves statutory or collective licenses.
Statutory or "compulsory" licenses are, in practice, not very different from
collective licenses. Both are hybrids of statutory benchmarks with private
bargaining; both involve significant government oversight and expensive
negotiation; both are better at collecting royalties than disbursing them.22 9
Together, the various statutory licenses form a patchwork of irreconcilable
terms, inconsistent prices and procedures, and the expensive necessity for
many-stop shopping for innovative uses. 23 0
The music performance collecting societies, meanwhile, are hardly
poster children for unregulated private market transactions. Both ASCAP
and BMI operate within the constraints of detailed antitrust decrees, limiting
their acquisition and control of copyright rights, defining the class of
members they must agree to admit, restricting the scope and terms of the
licenses they may grant, forbidding them from discriminating in license
price among similarly situated licensees or interfering with their members'
ability to offer competing licenses, obliging them to make a list of works they
are entitled to license available to the public, and instructing them how to
Internet webcasters. See id. H 114, 115; United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 275-77 (2009); Loren,
226.
supra note 88.
227. See generally Licensing Information, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/
licensing/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (providing information and forms related to licensing).
228. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 2 18-36; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyight) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGALSTUD. 325, 326 (1989).
229. The performing rights organizations divide royalties among their members according
to each organization's secret formula. Most of the compulsory license royalties are, in theory,
allocated among claimants by copyright royalty judges. The statutory sections that call for
license fees to be paid into a common fund and then divided among claimants don't include
provisions that would assist the copyright royalty judges charged with disbursing the royalties to
allocate the funds in the pot. Rather, the statute encourages claimants to negotiate among
themselves to arrive at both the royalty rates and a division that they find satisfactory. See 17
U.S.C. §§ iii(d), 112(e)(2), 114(e), 118(b)(2), 11g(c), 80 3 (b)( 3 ), 805, 007. In the three
decades since the 1976 act took effect, copyright owner claimants have pursued a strategy of
driving the cost of claiming a share up to levels that discourage claimants unless they are
represented by collecting societies or big trade associations, and then negotiating with the
remaining big fish to divide the spoils.
230.
See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 106-44 (testimony of Mary Beth Peters);
Loren, supra note 88.
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divide up and distribute the royalties they collect.231 The pricing of ASCAP
and BMI licenses, moreover, is subject to review by a federal court. Thus
both compulsory licenses and collective licenses are extensively cabined by
government regulation, and both feature terms derived through private
negotiation. Recent efforts to replace complicated compulsory or collective
license procedures with something more streamlined have foundered on
each entrenched intermediary's efforts to preserve its particular slice of the
pie. The Creative Commons has devised forms and procedures to simplify
2 2
licensing of uncompensated uses of copyrighted material. 3 Its efforts to
2 33
field comparable commercial licenses have thus far been less successful.
With that background, one approach to the problems of licensing
suggests itself. De-trenching current intermediaries would serve both
simplification and disintermediation goals. If we forget about politics, the
easiest way to get there is to junk all of the statutory licenses, return licensing
authority to the individual authors of each work, and see whether those who
rely on the licenses find it worthwhile to devise voluntary collective licenses
to replace them. Any new collective licenses would of course beget new
intransigent intermediaries to administer them. To limit the damage from
re-entrenching intermediaries, therefore, the law should allow these
collecting agents to operate without heightened antitrust scrutiny only to the
extent that they meet significant statutory conditions derived from what
we've learned in seventy years of antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and BMI,
crafted to ensure transparency and competition, and designed to make
retrenchment difficult.234 To ensure that, at least as an initial matter, these
agents represent the creators whose works they license, it might be wise to
require the collecting agents to pay creators' shares of the royalties directly
to the creators, as ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange do today, rather than
2 35
funneling the payments through the copyright owners.
A law adopting the reforms suggested thus far would represent a shift
from a model based on concentrating the ownership of copyright rights into
the hands of a single entity whenever possible, to a model encouraging non-

United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. June
United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,941 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), modified, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); seeCrane, supra note 226.
See License Your Work, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/choose/ (last
232.
visited Sept. 17, 2010).
See CCPlus,CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Ccplus (last visited
233.
231.

11, 2001);

Sept. 17, 2010); Metadata Lab, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://abs.creativecommons.org/demos/
metadata/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).

234. Such conditions might include provisions that collecting agents may administer only
nonexclusive rights, must accept as members anyone who seeks membership and allow any
current member to defect to a competitor, must offer per use as well as blanket licenses, must
make lists of works they license readily available to public, and must make the terms of division
and payment readily available to both members and licensees.
235. See Litman, supra note 88, at 43-44.
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exclusive exploitation by multiple entities. In many ways, U.S. copyright law
began to move in that direction when Congress adopted divisibility of
copyright, but was stymied by the problems attending licensing. If we can
solve the licensing snafus without concentrating all copyright control in a
small number of hands, we can build a system that is friendlier to creators,
friendlier to readers, and friendlier to a wide swathe of different
intermediaries, without giving current players excessive incentives to elbow
new entrants out of the picture frame.
E. SuMMARY
My proposals are modest. I've suggested that we limit copyright's
exclusive rights to uses that involve commercial exploitation. I've proposed
that we subject copyright assignments to an author's residual authority to
grant licenses, subject to a duty to account, and that we treat uses incidental
to licensed uses as impliedly authorized. I have recommended that we
reinvigorate termination of transfers, and expressly recognize reader
liberties. Finally, I've proposed that we abolish the current statutory licenses.
These proposals leave the broad outlines of copyright law in place. They
don't seek to "turn copyright on its head,"236 limit its duration to the span
envisioned by the framers,23 7 or require the United States to withdraw from
or seek to rewrite international copyright treaties.238 Because my goals
reinforce one another, it is possible to accomplish a fair amount of
improvement with relatively small adjustments. Getting rid of more than 200
pages full of complicated and historically contingent limitations, restrictions,
exceptions, conditions, provisos, and complexities does much of the heavy
lifting. It makes the law shorter, simpler, and easier to explain. I don't
pretend that it will be possible to keep a new statute short and simple. In
time, even a spanking-clean copyright law will acquire its own set of
historically contingent complexities. But, at least we will have started from
the conditions that plague us in the twenty-first century rather than carrying
forward the ones we adopted to address the ills of the eighteenth,
nineteenth, or twentieth.

236. Keith Kupferschmid, Are Authors and Publishers Getting Scroogled?, INFORMATION TODAY,
Dec. 1, 2005, 2005 WLNR 22457424; see Edward Wyatt, Google Library DatabaseIs Delayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at Bg (quoting Patricia Schroeder, President of the Association of
American Publishers).
237.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 133-35 (2004); see also Rufus Pollock, Forever
Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term (June 15, 2009) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/optimal copyright-term.
pdf.
238. See FISHER, supra note 114, at 248-49.
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GETTING THERE FROM HERE

I boasted earlier that the conventions of legal scholarship allow me to
propose copyright reforms that I cannot realistically imagine Congress's
enacting. That permitted me to put off, until now, the question of the
prudence of entrusting control of copyright reform to the owners of
twentieth-century copyrights, and the related question of whether it is
possible to dislodge them.
In the previous Part, I made a series of suggestions for reforming the
copyright law to address the most troubling problems of the current
copyright system. The reforms I outlined were more in the nature of
copyright repairs than copyright revolt. They seek to improve the operation
of the copyright system for creators and for readers, listeners, and viewers
without wholesale demolition. They also seek to diminish the incentives of
vested intermediaries, but to make licensing easier. Finally, they are crafted
to improve the system's legitimacy. They join a large collection of thoughtful
proposals by proponents of copyright reform across the spectrum of
copyright politics.239 None of these proposals is likely to attract serious
attention from Congress or copyright lobbyists.
Right now the copyright-legislation playing field is completely
controlled by its beneficiaries. They have persuaded Congress that it is
pointless to try to enact copyright laws without their assent. They are
unlikely to countenance a statute that disempowers them in meaningful
ways. Even if copyright lobbyists are privately persuaded of the wisdom of a
reform proposal, they are unlikely to agree to it if it leaves their clients worse
off than before. To accomplish real copyright reform, then, we will need to
change the way that copyright laws are made. 240 That may be an impossible
task, at least in the near term. Members of Congress are unlikely to consider
untried approaches unless they believe that their constituents expect it of
them, will pay attention, and may take it into account when they vote. The
first step in that direction, though, is to encourage a broader conversation
about why the copyright system isn't working and what kinds of changes
might be possible.
We can't trust the copyright clergy to initiate that conversation on our
behalf. They don't need to. They can rely on rhetoric that brands any

239.

E.g., id.; KWALL, supra note 184; Gervais, supra note 23; Ginsburg, supra note 64;

LESSIG, supra note 237; Netanel, supra note 114; Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra

note 114; Samuelson, supra note 114; Sprigman, supra note 184.
24o. Accord Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
CreativeMotivation To Shape Copyright Protection,69 LA. L. REV. I (2oo8); Samuelson, supra note
114; Lawrence Lessig, Required Reading: The Next io Years, LESSIG 2.0 (June 19, 2007, 2:07 AM),
http://Iessig.org/blog/2007/o6/required-reading-the nexts oy- .html.
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copyright critique as "anti-copyright," 24' "anti-author,"242 anti-property,243
and an attack on creators' livelihoods.244 Copyright reformers who make
proposals that won't inure to the benefit of extant copyright owners are said
to pursue the religion of "information wants to be free." 245 Copyright
owners warn that rebalancing the law to limit copyright owners' control will
kill the goose that lays the golden egg.24 6 Authors' advocates go along,
pinning their hopes on the promise that if copyright owners can only
persuade Congress to strengthen their hands sufficiently, some of the
benefits of enhanced copyright will trickle down to creators.
That seems
improbable.
If Congress's repeated
copyright
enhancements have not yet manifested themselves in greater creator wealth,
it might be that even very large increases in the scope and value of copyright
are unlikely to have a perceptible effect on creators because the structure of
the current U.S. copyright system allows creators to capture so small a slice
of copyright. It would take massive additional copyright protection before
any measurable improvement for creators would show up. So long as the
advocates for copyright expansion are permitted to claim the pro-author
mantle, however, the idea that creators might be better off if distributors'
rights were narrower is a difficult sell.
Rebutting the notion that copyright owners speak for authors, or that
their interests are usually aligned, then, may be a crucial strategic move. The
recent polarization of copyright discourse makes the approach trickier than
it might have been ten or twenty years ago. We've been arguing for so long
that advocates have grown immune to reason and example.24 7 Even if the
241. Turkewitz, supra note 222; see, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xiv-xv, 33-39; James V.
Delong, Defending IntellectualProperty, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17, 17-18 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews,Jr. eds., 2002).
See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xiv, 99-100, 216-17; Marci A. Hamilton, The
242.
DistantDrumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information Era, in THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:
TWENTYYEARS OF CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAWJOURNAL (Peter K. Yu ed., 2002).

243.

See, e.g., Thomas D. Sydnor II, Tragedy and Farce: An Analysis of the Book Free Culture,

PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash, D.C.) Apr. 2008, available at http://

www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop I 5 .5freecultureanalys.pdf.
244. See, e.g., Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, noth Cong. 23-26 (2008),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Carneso8o3 I .pdf (testimony of Rick
Carnes, President, Songwriters Guild of America).
245. E.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xii-xiii, 33-39, 51-55; Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at
679. The phrase, attributed by Wikipedia to Stewart Brand, author of the Wole Earth Catalog,
took on new meaning as a challenge to copyright when John Perry Barlow repurposed it in his
essay, The Economy of Ideas: A Frameworkfor Patents and Copyrights in the DigitalAge. (Everything You
Know About IntellectualProperty Is Wrong.), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 89.
246. HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 214; Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 689.
247. A single example that I think is more sad than offensive: Noted novelist Mark Helprin
published a book-length hysterical screed last year that purports to expose an anti-copyright
conspiracy, but is primarily an ad hominem attack on Larry Lessig and the Creative Commons.
HELPRIN, supra note 65. Lessig responded with an anguished book review posted to the
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benefits of a simpler, shorter, more legitimate law were obvious to all
copyright-affected interests, the current climate would make such proposals
controversial. Focusing on specific reforms that might make copyright law
more creator-friendly as well as more reader-friendly may give us a small
wedge that will allow further conversation. One of copyright's most
important functions should be to facilitate connections between creators
and readers, listeners, and viewers. If creators and readers examine the ways
the current copyright system fails to do this, both groups may question
whether continuing to cede copyright lawmaking to copyright owners is
wise.
VI. CONCLUSION

Our copyright system still bears the imprint of its original design. In
179o, reproduction and distribution were expensive, and Congress chose to
give authors narrow, short-lived, alienable rights in the works they created
and to encourage them to transfer those rights to distributors in return for
publication and, sometimes, a little money. Distribution is no longer so
expensive. Copyright rights are no longer so narrow. Copyright terms are no
longer short. Copyrights are still, however, alienable, and the system still
encourages creators to convey all of their rights to distributors in return for
dissemination and, sometimes, a little money. The justifications for
concentrating copyrights in distributors' hands make less sense today, when
copyrights last lifetimes and cover myriad uses that might intrigue different
sorts of distributors at different times, and when mass distribution no longer
requires massive capital investment.
The opportunities offered by inexpensive digital distribution allow us to
think seriously about enhancing copyright's legitimacy by building the
copyright system so that it better meets the needs of creators and of readers,
viewers, and listeners. That's a conversation that all of us need to be having,
now, while copyright revision is still just beginning.

Huffington Post. See Lawrence Lessig, The Solipsist and the Internet (A Review of Helprin's Digital
Barbarism), HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2009, 05:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/

lawrence-lessig/the-solipsist-and-the-int b_206021 .html. From my vantage point as a copyright
criticizer and Lessig friend, Helprin's book seems delusional; from Helprin's viewpoint though,
I and other scholars like me are either communist conspirators or thralls.
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